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The adoption of a controversial foreign agents law by Georgia’s ruling party in May marked the lowest point in Tbilisi’s relations with the West since it declared its pro-Western foreign-policy aspirations in the early 2000s. Despite mass protests, a presidential veto overriding the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, U.S. sanctions against Georgian officials, and the European Union halting Tbilisi’s membership bid, the government pushed through with the measure.
When the Georgian Dream party government first attempted to adopt the law last year, tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets to condemn the legislation, which resembles a foreign agents law that Russia adopted in 2012. Under Georgia’s law, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and independent media that receive more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad are obliged to register as entities acting in the interest of foreign power.
The adoption of a controversial foreign agents law by Georgia’s ruling party in May marked the lowest point in Tbilisi’s relations with the West since it declared its pro-Western foreign-policy aspirations in the early 2000s. Despite mass protests, a presidential veto overriding the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, U.S. sanctions against Georgian officials, and the European Union halting Tbilisi’s membership bid, the government pushed through with the measure.
When the Georgian Dream party government first attempted to adopt the law last year, tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets to condemn the legislation, which resembles a foreign agents law that Russia adopted in 2012. Under Georgia’s law, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and independent media that receive more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad are obliged to register as entities acting in the interest of foreign power.
This year’s demonstrations failed to stop the legislation, but protesters remain hopeful that the country’s parliamentary elections on Oct. 26 will bring change. While the foreign agents law is perhaps the most eye-opening sign of Georgia’s drift away from the West, it is only one symptom of the issue.
Since adopting the law, Georgia has already lost some of the valuable perks of its close cooperation with the West. Washington, its closest strategic partner, announced in May that it would review its cooperation frameworks with Tbilisi and indefinitely postponed the annual Noble Partner military exercise. In a landmark move, the United States also imposed sanctions and travel bans on dozens of Georgian officials, including members of Parliament who voted in favor of the law and representatives of the law enforcement agencies that cracked down on protesters.
The U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee also introduced a bipartisan bill that envisions sanctions on individuals who are responsible for “undermining democracy” in Georgia. At the same time, it is in Washington’s interest to keep Tbilisi on its Euro-Atlantic path, and the United States is leaving room for the normalization of relations. The House bill offers key provisions should Georgia reverse its current stance and demonstrate democratic progress, including visa simplification, negotiations over more favorable trade agreements, and further economic aid.
But given rising anti-Western rhetoric in Georgia, it looks unlikely that bilateral relations with the United States will go back to normal in the near future—unless the elections bring some change. Due to similar concerns, the United Kingdom also recently paused its annual strategic discussions with Georgia.
Georgia’s relations with the EU do not look favorable, either. Instead of opening accession talks—which Tbilisi could achieve if it met the requirements set out by the Brussels in December 2023, when it was granted candidate status—its accession process is now frozen. Citing democratic backsliding, the EU has also frozen 30 million euros ($32.4 million) of military aid for Georgia. These measures are only a preview of what may happen in the future, unless the elections can undo some of the damage.
Georgia’s collision course with its Western allies threatens the economic lifeline that the EU and the United States provide on a yearly basis. Over the past 32 years, the United States has provided more than $6.2 billion in economic and development assistance to Georgia. Meanwhile, the EU provides Georgia with an annual grant worth more than $92 million.
From an economic perspective, Moscow cannot substitute the Western support to Tbilisi: It is suffering under the weight of sanctions and remains invested in its war in Ukraine. As a result, Georgia has recently looked to pursue a multivector foreign-policy agenda by cozying up to China.
In 2023, Georgia signed a strategic partnership agreement with China that strengthened their bilateral cooperation. Beijing is Tbilisi’s third-largest trade partner. And in recent years, China has increasingly invested in major infrastructure projects in Georgia.
Tbilisi’s decision to award the construction of a major strategic project, the Anaklia deep-sea port, to a Chinese-Singaporean consortium marks a new milestone in Chinese engagement in the region: The decision is particularly problematic because one of the Chinese companies involved has been blacklisted by the U.S. Department of Commerce for building artificial islands as part of an effort to militarize the South China Sea.
The Anaklia deep-sea port holds significant importance for Georgia both politically and economically. Given its strategic location on the Black Sea, it could turn Georgia into a major trading hub connecting Europe and Asia and provide an opportunity to deepen relations with Western partners that are seeking to rely on trade routes that bypass Russia.
Yet China’s involvement means that Beijing will significantly increase its presence in the Black Sea—undermining the West’s interests in the region. The West already faces major challenges there from Russia’s consistent attempts to militarize and dominate the Black Sea and turn it into a first line of defense against NATO and the EU.
Georgia’s efforts to build stronger economic ties with China could have seemed like a pragmatic decision for a small country. But in light of its self-alienation from long-standing Western partners, it seems like a dangerous move.
Beijing may bring greater economic gains, but it will not commit to providing security guarantees or investing in the resilience of Tbilisi against the threat from Moscow. China and Russia often embrace similar narratives with regard to the malign interests of the West, and particularly the United States, in post-Soviet states.
In the short term, Russia may not mind seeing China emerge as an important regional player if it fast-tracks Georgia’s alienation from the West. But Moscow sees Tbilisi as part of its sphere of influence, and in the long term, it won’t want to find itself competing directly with Beijing, which can offer much bigger economic incentives.
However, Russia still has much stronger political leverage: It has occupied the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and significantly undermined Georgia’s security.
Further militarization of the Black Sea through the expansion of the Russian naval presence in the occupied Abkhazia could serve as such leverage. Last year, the de facto leader of Abkhazia, Aslan Bzhania, announced that Russia intends to convert an existing port in the Ochamchire district into a naval base.
If Moscow goes ahead with the plan, the new base could act as a temporary refuge from Ukrainian attacks on Russian naval assets in the Black Sea. This would significantly worsen Georgia’s fragile security environment, forcing it to grapple with emerging threats without the support of its Western partners. Such prospects of escalation once again demonstrate that Georgia cannot stand alone in the face of Russian aggression.
These latest developments make the Oct. 26 election one of the most dramatic in Georgia’s recent history. Never, in the past two decades, have European and Euro-Atlantic foreign policy aspirations been challenged or undermined to this extent in Tbilisi. With nearly 90 percent of Georgians still supporting the country’s pro-Western trajectory, the Georgian Dream government is placing itself in an awkward position.
After 12 years in power, the Georgian Dream government is aiming to prolong its tenure once again—yet it faces a tight race ahead. While the ruling party has framed itself as the only guarantor of peace and traditional values, the country’s four main opposition parties have promised to pursue Georgia’s EU integration efforts and to repair Georgia’s relations with the West.
The protests in May made clear that Georgians see the bigger picture beyond the immediate impact of the foreign agents law on civil liberties. The upcoming elections have gained a greater significance: The developments on Saturday will determine where Georgia will stand amid greater geopolitical changes in the region.
At the polls, Georgians won’t make a choice between political elites or ideologies, but rather about whether Georgian democracy survives.