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Early Life and Career
Halleck was born on a farm in Upstate New York and hated that life. He was raised by an uncle who set him up for a military career. He went to West Point where he excelled, graduating 3rd in his class. He was a favorite student of Dennis Hart Mahan. He became a member of the elite Army Corps of Engineers, who studied and improved the defenses of New York Harbor and traveled to Europe to see what the French were doing. He along the way wrote books on military science. He gave a series of lectures in Boston which were collected and published in 1846 as Elements of Military Art & Science.
On his way to California for the Mexican War, he didn’t waste his time playing shuffleboard; he instead did something that made him quite famous. He translated Jomini’s Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoleon into English. This book made him famous in America and in Europe. The point of this book was how Napoleon used his military power to achieve political ends.
He was engaged at the Battle of Mazatlán but was primarily an administrative officer. Having achieved a reputation as a military scholar, he acquired the nickname “Old Brains”.
After the war, he resigned from the army opened a law firm, and became secretary of state of California. He married Elizabeth Hamilton, Alexander Hamilton’s granddaughter. He resigned from the army in 1854. His firm Halleck, Peachy, and Billings was highly prominent. He also was for a time president of the Atlantic and Pacific RR. He also remained a Major General in the California militia. Through land speculation, became a wealthy man. He owned a 30,000-acre ranch in Marin County.
The Civil War Begins
When the Civil War broke out, Halleck promptly volunteered, and Abraham Lincoln promptly made him a full major general. Despite being out of the army at that point for 7 years, he was ranked only by Winfield Scott, George McClellan, and John C. Frémont.
In November, Halleck was sent to St. Louis in command of the Department of the Missouri. He replaced Frémont, who had been nothing short of a disaster. The department was rife with corruption and fraud. Halleck quickly put his administrative talents to work, and within a few months restored a measure of order to a region defined up to that point by chaos.
A series of important Union victories in his department followed. Even though he did not lead the troops personally, his organizational work had helped and Halleck, rightly or wrongly, received much of the credit. These included Pea Ridge, Island No. 10, Fort Donelson, and Shiloh. Although he was not the commander in the field in any of these battles, he was responsible for ordering the movements that led to the battles, supervising the generals who were there, and supplying their forces.
After Shiloh, he led the Corinth campaign. His approach was to move slowly and entrench every mile or so. His methodical style was not what was needed. Beauregard was able to hold the city for over a month, then retreat without a battle. In retrospect, he could have captured the town in a week. Keeping in mind that he was a student of Mahan, and translated Jomini, both defense-minded strategists, he was fighting a Napoleonic war, not the Civil War. Old Brains was strategically obsolete.
Halleck & Grant
His relationship with his best subordinate general was difficult. When the senior manager has in his department a budding genius, how that relationship plays out tells you oodles about the kind of person he is. Ulysses Grant was a brigadier general in Halleck’s department who had never been in command of anything before, perhaps including his own sobriety. But Grant proposed an amphibious combined forces operation on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers to take out Forts Henry and Donelson. Nothing like that had ever been tried and certainly was not in the books Halleck had written. I’m not sure what any of us would have thought about Sam Grant in January 1862 if we were his superior, especially when he proposed an aggressive attack to a defense-minded Old Brain.
But the resulting victory and capture of 14,000 confederates as the eastern theater was doing nothing made Halleck an important man. He promoted Grant but then relieved him, only to reinstate him. Grant wondered about this, leading to a highly cynical response from Halleck that whistles throughout history.
What did Sherman and Grant think about Halleck at this point? Was it accurate?
What changed Halleck’s mind about Grant’s plan for Fort Donelson was President Lincoln’s need for a victory. Lincoln was insistent that an offensive be started, and Halleck had no better ideas. Lincoln order was issued January 27th, ordering all Federal forces to advance on February 22nd.
But despite the victories at Donelson & Henry, Halleck initially demoted him. Grant left his district to meet Buell in Nashville and did not immediately stop looting at the two captured forts. Halleck also cited rumors of renewed alcoholism. There are rumors of a rogue telegraph operator tossing Grant’s messages to Halleck, but Halleck had issues throughout the war. The recent Samuel Curtis bio suggests that Halleck had his aides create a digest for all communications, so Halleck was constantly under the impression that his subordinates were not communicating to him regularly when the digest failed to represent their activity. Ostensibly, for whatever reason, Halleck claimed Grant had gone incommunicado, but there appears to have been some jealousy involved because instead of claiming that Grant was not communicating appropriately, Halleck accused him of being drunk.
Once again, Lincoln and Stanton intervened. Lincoln asked Halleck to forward specific charges against Grant for official review, and Halleck was promoted to command of all armies in the west. His jealousy being sated and his hand called, Halleck restored Grant to command. Their correspondence is ironic because Grant complained about his arrest by claiming “… there must be enemies between you and myself” and Halleck responded “…there are no enemies between myself and you,” which was the truth because the enemy was Halleck himself.
Why Halleck wanted to take credit for Grant’s victory isn’t hard to understand; because it was the first major Federal victory of the war, and Halleck could parlay the victory into command of all forces in the West. Lincoln needed a general who wasn’t afraid to fight. In that sense, Halleck was a clone of McClellan, and they couldn’t have that in both theaters. Grant asked him if someone was giving Halleck bad reports about him, Halleck responded in the negative without telling him that it was he, himself, responsible. Halleck was not the commander of the Western Theater; Buell was his competition. Halleck needed the credit for his advancement.
At this stage of the war, both Grant and Sherman thought highly of Halleck and owed him their positions. Halleck was the master at that point in the war, certainly in terms of paperwork and administration. Grant had many of the qualities of a great leader that Halleck would never have: gut instinct, fearlessness, and indomitable energy. But any book on being a CEO today will tell you just as important is a sense of humility. If you find yourself the smartest person in the room, you’re in the wrong room. Grant was not a great military thinker, but he was the greatest idea aggregator. He sought to surround himself with thinkers and then would forge plans as an aggregate of the part. Grant regarded Halleck as “one of the greatest men of the age” and Sherman described him as the “directing genius”. And why not? Halleck was in command of the best department in the Army at that point. Curtis had won at Pea Ridge, Pope at Island Number 10, and Grant at Donelson. And in fact, he deserves some of the credit. Halleck understood grand strategy a little better than McClellan and had the ability to recognize and promote talent, but also the ambition and ego to resent being overshadowed by their successes. Lincoln put him in the right place – where he could have rank and wield some power, and be close to power, but where he couldn’t interfere any more than Lincoln himself allowed him to. He was more than a clerk but much less than the commanding general he wanted to be.
Advancement to General-in-Chief
In March 1862 Halleck was given command also of Ohio and Kansas, placing Buell under his command. With Grant under personal attack after Shiloh, Halleck arrived to personally command this army and move on to Corinth. While Grant felt that he was being shunted aside, Halleck to some extent was doing them both a favor.
With the fall of Corinth and the collapse of the Peninsula Campaign, Halleck was transferred east to become General-in-Chief. He placed Grant in command of most of the Western forces. Lincoln was hopeful that Halleck could stimulate aggressiveness; but while Halleck excelled at training, supply, and deployment, he was awful as a strategist and unable to work with the generals under him, who simply ignored him.
Most accounts of Halleck moving Grant to his second in command suggest a nefarious motivation. The problem is that while how things turned out for Grant is well known, after Shiloh, he was under a massive media attack. The fact that Grant had been the victim of a surprise attack made him, at that moment, tough to support. But as much as Halleck didn’t support Grant, he was even less inclined to trust the volunteer generals under him.
But his failings at this level of command would soon become obvious. His biggest failure was the coup de grace for Lincoln’s views of him. When McClellan didn’t come to support Pope at Second Manassas, Lincoln lost hope in Halleck, calling him “little more than a first-rate clerk”. To be fair, there were no better generals for either Lincoln or Halleck to select from, and it’s a bit unfair to pin the blame on Halleck. Lincoln had promoted him to get the results he had in the west, but with eastern generals. Still, Halleck was a bit thin-skinned and thereafter refused to take direct responsibility for anything that happened.
His subordinates had little respect for him. McClellan said of Halleck, “Of all the men who I have encountered in high position, Halleck was the most helplessly stupid. It was more difficult to get an idea through his head than can be conceived by anyone who never made the attempt. I do not think he ever had a correct military idea from beginning to end.” Gideon Welles, the Secretary of the Navy wrote, “Halleck originates nothing, anticipates nothing to assist others; takes no responsibility, plans nothing, suggests nothing, is good for nothing.”
Grant Supersedes Halleck
Grant was promoted to Lt Gen and general-in-chief on March 12, 1864. Halleck became chief of staff, and Grant graciously stated that he had been relieved at his own request. Grant of course took a completely different view of the job than Halleck had, accompanying Meade’s army in the field and setting strategy at the battlefield.
Which left Halleck back in Washington, doing what he did best: ensuring proper supplies, equipment, and manpower. He supported Grant’s initiatives politically and the two worked very well in complementary roles. But with Jubal Early threatening the city, Halleck had responsibility for its defense. Halleck’s inability to organize a defense of the capital was his final disgrace. Chaos reigned. He did ultimately gather together a force that held Early off. Were it not for Monocacy, he might have entered the city.
After the War
With Lincoln’s assassination, Stanton took the first opportunity he could and moved Halleck out of Washington to a new job, where Halleck made a very serious political enemy. Stanton had had enough of Halleck, and without Lincoln around to hold him back, he made Halleck commander of the Division of the James, which meant Richmond. When Sherman offered Johnston the infamous gracious original surrender terms, Stanton suggested that Sherman was a traitor (actually, he was implementing what he thought Lincoln would have wanted based on their meeting at City Point) and Halleck, ever the politician, went along with it. This upset Sherman; and things deteriorated when at the Grand Review Halleck ordered one of Sherman’s Corps to pass him, which Sherman countermanded. This was a shocking turn of events since Halleck had given Sherman every opportunity to rehabilitate himself when he was deemed “crazy” at the start of the war.
Consequently, just 4 months later, Grant moved him to political exile Grant moved him back to San Francisco as commander of the Division of the Pacific. Given his home and residence there, Grant must be complimented on trying to help out his old chief as best as he could. A few years later, he was moved to command in Louisville, where he died a few years later.
Conclusion
Halleck was a bureaucrat, in every sense of the word, both good and bad. His need for success, like many of the others in the Union Army at the start of the war, precluded taking chances or doing anything not politically correct. He also had the wrong temperament for field command and was promoted beyond his capability. Still, he was an intelligent man whose inability to work with others led to terrible personal relationships, rather than he being incompetent. Administration takes on a negative connotation in the context of glorified heroes of battle, but he should be recognized for his positive contributions as well as his flaws.
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