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The Union forces consisted of approximately 100,000 troops from the Army of the Potomac (AoP), led by General George Meade, and an additional 15,000 soldiers from the independent IX Corps, commanded by General Ambrose Burnside. Both Meade and Burnside reported to General Grant, who oversaw the entire operation. On the opposing side, General Robert E Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) was estimated to have around 55,000 men, having suffered approximately 11,000 casualties during the Wilderness battle. Notably, two of the three corps within Lee’s army had temporary commanders due to illness and injury: Second Corps under Maj Gen AP Hill would be led by Maj Gen Jubal Early due to Hill’s illness, and Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson would replace Lt. Gen. James Longstreet in command of the First Corps following his wounding on May 6. Third Corps remained under Gen Richard Ewell’s command. Lee visited A.P. Hill’s headquarters and found him very ill in bed. He had considered Early to replace the wounded Longstreet but decided to promote R H. Anderson who had previously been in the I Corps before Jackson’s death. With Hill sick Lee assigned Early temporary command of the III Corps. Gordon was promoted to command Early’s division.
All these arrangements were temporary. Hill returned to command the III Corps and Early returned to his division and Gordon was assigned Johnson’s division. When Ewell was sent to command the Richmond district, Early was promoted to command the II Corps and Ramseur took Early’s division.
General Lee found himself uncertain about Grant’s intentions after the Wilderness. Reconnaissance revealed that the river crossing equipment at Germanna Ford across the Rappahannock River was removed, indicating that Grant did not plan to withdraw as his predecessors had done. This left Lee contemplating whether the Union Army was heading east toward Fredericksburg or moving south. Lee recognized the significance of the crossroads at Spotsylvania Court House, which served as the intersection between Brock Road and the road leading to Fredericksburg, and hence was a central point for either destination.
Lee instructed his artillery chief to construct a road through the woods, connecting the Confederate position at the Wilderness to the Catharpin Road leading south. Although Lee did not emphasize the need for urgency, General Anderson and his troops were eager to leave behind the devastation of the burning forest and corpses in the Wilderness, prompting them to commence their march around 10 pm on May 7th. The arrival of the ANV at the critical crossroads of Spotsylvania Court House just moments before the AoP was a result of a delay in the Union movement and the construction of the road by the Confederates.
May 7
On the evening of May 7th, Grant issued orders for the AoP to commence their march towards Spotsylvania Court House. The overarching strategy devised by General Grant aimed to interpose his forces between the ANV and Richmond and to engage Lee in an open region so he could take advantage of his numerical superiority.
Grant ordered an advance along two separate routes to reach Spotsylvania Court House, which lay approximately 10 miles to the southeast. One of these routes, the more direct path, was assigned to Warren’s V Corps, who would proceed along the Brock Road. Following closely behind them was Maj Gen Winfield Scott Hancock’s II Corps. Maj Gen John Sedgwick’s VI Corps was directed to head towards Chancellorsville via the Orange Plank Road, before eventually turning south. Burnside’s IX Corps was bringing up the rear, following the same route as Sedgwick’s forces.
May 8
Confederate Gen. J.E.B. Stuart was ordered to prevent the Federals from reaching Spotsylvania. Fitzhugh Lee led a division of Stuart’s cavalry in a fierce battle against the Union cavalry for control of the Brock Road that lasted 2 days. The Union troopers faced additional difficulties in clearing the road due to obstacles. Meanwhile, Wade Hampton and Rooney Lee’s cavalrymen halted the progress of Colonel J. Irvin Gregg’s brigade at Corbin’s Bridge on the Catharpin Road. Another confrontation unfolded between Wesley Merritt’s Union division and Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry, who had taken positions behind barricades on Brock Road, approximately a mile south of Todd’s Tavern. Intense fighting ensued, leading to a stalemate by late afternoon. Todd’s Tavern was at the crossroads of Brock Road and Catharpin Road. This was the finish line of the race; for the army with control of this junction, Spotsylvania was just a bit down the road. That is why the indirect route Burnside & Sedgwick took was so critical: that route takes them beyond Todd’s Tavern without going through the intersection there, or to take an eastern or southern flanking. It means that Todd’s Tavern is an inherently unholdable base.
As darkness fell, General Sheridan decided to halt the advance and ordered his men to set up camp at Todd’s Tavern. The first Union infantry began moving at 8 pm, but their advance was plagued by traffic jams. When Meade reached Todd’s Tavern after midnight he was infuriated to see Sheridan’s sleeping cavalrymen and ordered them to resume their road-clearing operation.
General Lee’s forces were compelled to retreat from Todd’s Tavern and regrouped at a strategically advantageous position called Laurel Hill, located on the south side of the Brock Road. This hill was the last defensible position north of Spotsylvania, and losing it would also mean surrendering control of the crucial crossroads at the courthouse. Fortunately for the Confederates, Anderson arrived at Spotsylvania on the morning of May 8, positioning his troops within two miles of Laurel Hill, which was a low ridge just south of the Spindle farm clearing.
Meade ordered the infantry to attack the cavalry positions. Fitzhugh Lee’s horse artillery valiantly defended the Alsop farm, causing a delay in the Union’s advancement. Meanwhile, the cavalrymen established a defensive line on Laurel Hill. Recognizing the need for reinforcements, Lee called upon Anderson’s infantry, who had already reached the Block House Bridge on the Po River and were having breakfast. Anderson promptly dispatched two infantry brigades and an artillery battalion.
Laurel Hill was the Confederate center of gravity; if they could push their way beyond, it would put Lee on the defensive with fewer and less bloodshed would be loss. The Union high command did not know how many soldiers had filtered through to Laurel Hill when they originally arrived. The Confederates beat them there by a matter of minutes. If there was not a delaying action by the Confederates the Union would have easily beat them to it because the Confederates had a head start to Spotsylvania due to their interior lines and had unintentionally began withdrawing after the fire in the forest at the Wilderness.
Union Major General Gouverneur K. Warren was under the impression that Spotsylvania was within his reach, and led his Fifth Corps up the hill. To his surprise, he encountered Anderson’s corps opposing him, which had arrived at Laurel Hill just as Warren’s troops approached from the north, coming within 100 yards. Warren’s attempts to push back the Confederates were met with significant casualties, leading both sides to begin fortifying their positions.
Later in the day, Sedgwick’s VI Corps arrived near Laurel Hill and extended Warren’s line to the east. At 7 pm both corps launched a coordinated assault, but they were met with heavy enemy fire and were unable to make significant progress. They tried to maneuver around Anderson’s right flank, only to be caught off guard by the arrival of divisions from Ewell’s Second Corps, who were there to repel them once again. Meade had lost the race despite having the inside track, based on the existing roads.
The ensuing disagreement between Meade and Sheridan regarding the effectiveness of the cavalry arm and its role in the movement sparked a quarrel. Sheridan firmly believed that he could defeat Stuart if given the opportunity. When this was reported to Grant, he responded, “Well, he generally knows what he is talking about. Let him start right out and do it.” This sequence of events led to the Battle of Yellow Tavern, but was also responsible for the absence of Union cavalry for the remainder of the battle at Spotsylvania, which would delay a full comprehension of the battlefield.
While Warren’s unsuccessful attack on Laurel Hill was taking place on the morning of May 8, Hancock’s II Corps had reached Todd’s Tavern and established defensive positions on the Catharpin Road, protecting the rear of the Union army.
May 9
Grant made several attempts to break the Confederate line over the next few days, employing various strategies. The Union troops also began entrenching themselves as they prepared for the ongoing battle. On the night of May 8, the outnumbered Confederate forces entrenched along a 4-mile stretch, adopting a defensive strategy that would become a hallmark of this battle and continue to be utilized well into the 20th century. The Confederate line extended from the Po River, encompassing the Laurel Hill line, crossing the Brock Road, forming a horseshoe shape, and extending south beyond the courthouse intersection. However, the exposed salient known as the “Mule Shoe,” which extended over a mile in front of the main line, posed a vulnerability in this arrangement. Despite this, it was deemed necessary to incorporate the high ground to Anderson’s right.
Tragically, during the inspection of his VI Corps line, Sedgwick was fatally shot by a Confederate sharpshooter using a Whitworth rifle from a distance of approximately 1000 feet. Sedgwick’s death was instantaneous, occurring shortly after he famously remarked, “… they couldn’t hit an elephant at this distance.”
Grant ordered Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock’s Second Corps to cross the Po River and locate Lee’s left flank. However, upon noticing Hancock’s movement, Lee swiftly shifted two divisions to counter the Union forces at Block House Bridge, successfully forcing them to retreat across the river. When Hancock advanced, he saw that the Confederates were heavily entrenched and did not attack. This delay led to the kind of set-piece battle Lee was expert in.
Burnside, positioned on the far left, made an advance along the Fredericksburg Road. However, the Union command was unaware of the fact that Lee had left only Wilcox’s division to defend the eastern flank when he moved to cover the Po. This lack of information was a direct consequence of the decision to send all of Sheridan’s cavalry away from the battlefield. As a result, there was a significant gap between Wilcox and Ewell. When Burnside encountered resistance from Wilcox, he hesitated and decided to entrench, despite successfully turning Lee’s right flank. Grant, realizing that Burnside was too isolated from the rest of the line, ordered him to pull back behind the Ni. That evening Grant decided that Burnside was too isolated from the rest of the line and ordered him to pull back behind the Ni. It is evident from his Memoirs that Grant realized only too late the potential opportunity he had lost.
May 10
Grant conducted a series of probing assaults along the entire length of the Confederate line in an attempt to identify weaknesses. He observed that Lee had concentrated his forces in front of Hancock’s position, effectively controlling both Block House Bridge and the southern area of the Po. Jubal Early launched an attack on General Barlow’s position, which forced Hancock to shift his corps westward for support. Consequently, Warren found himself alone facing Laurel Hill and was eager to launch an immediate attack. However, the presence of a grove of dead pine trees obstructed the assault, diminishing its impact.
Upton’s Attack
On the Union left Colonel Emory Upton’s brigade faced the Mule Shoe, with Burnside positioned on his flank. The Mule Shoe, located on the right side of the Confederate line, protruded beyond the rest of the trenches, making it a vulnerable point in Lee’s defenses at Spotsylvania. The Mule Shoe’s western edge later became infamous as the “Bloody Angle.”
Colonel Emory Upton gained recognition for his successful leadership in attacking entrenched positions during the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House. He introduced a novel tactic for assaulting Confederate entrenchments, which foreshadowed the trench warfare strategies employed in World War I. Instead of the traditional method of advancing slowly in wide battle lines and firing at the enemy, Upton devised a novel strategy. Instead of adhering to the traditional formation, he organized his regiments into a three-by-four-column arrangement, opting not to halt and fire while crossing the field, but rather to charge directly ahead. Instead of having his troops fire as they advanced, Upton organized his brigade to charge the enemy’s position in columns, without pausing to engage in gunfire. The primary objective was to swiftly reach the enemy’s fortifications, aiming to overpower them before they could mount a strong defense. The objective was to overwhelm the defenders in a specific sector by rapidly advancing with a large number of troops, without pausing to reload and fire. Referred to as the “stacking method of attack,” this approach involved engaging the enemy in close combat using bayonets and rifle butts, rather than wasting time on firing shots.
Emory Upton’s improvised charge at Spottsylvania had a profound impact on the course of the Civil War and revolutionized the tactics employed in warfare. Recognizing the ineffectiveness of the traditional infantry tactic of advancing in a long line, he opted for a different strategy. It was widely recognized that the conventional two-line attack, known as “Close Order,” was highly vulnerable to artillery fire when executed across an exposed field. The high casualties sustained during such attacks resulted in diminished effectiveness at the focal point of the assault. Not only did this approach result in a significantly reduced number of soldiers reaching the enemy’s fortifications, but even if the entrenchments were breached, there were insufficient forces to break the line or hold it against a counterattack.
Upton’s innovative approach was inspired during a reconnaissance mission alongside Lieutenant Ranald MacKenzie, a young engineer. MacKenzie had been assigned the task of identifying a suitable location for Upton’s regiments to strike the Confederate line. Earlier in the day, Union infantrymen had successfully pushed back a portion of the Confederate skirmish line, which was defended by Brigadier General George Doles’ Georgia brigade. Doles, however, failed to reestablish the line, granting MacKenzie and Upton an unobstructed view of the enemy’s position. Upon observation, they noticed a sharp swale on their right, partially shielding them from a battery of Richmond Howitzers positioned within Doles’ line. Additionally, the presence of a ridge directly ahead provided ample cover for the advancing Union forces as they traversed the open field.
Upton devised a brilliant strategy that set his plan apart from previous military tactics employed during the Civil War. Rather than send all of his men in one large charge (e.g., Pickett’s Charge), or en echelon (e.g., Hood and Longstreet on day 2 at Gettysburg), or in waves (e.g., Fredericksburg), Upton opted for a more calculated approach. He intended to provide substantial support for the attack by moving his column forward, breaking through the Rebel line, and holding the ground long enough for additional troops to exploit the breach. To ensure the success of his assault, Upton ordered an artillery bombardment on the targeted line and prepared his men to charge across an open field. One might question the efficacy of this compact formation, as it seemingly remained susceptible to artillery fire, particularly from the flank. Yet, the specific topography of the Mule Shoe battlefield played a crucial role in making this alignment the right choice.
However, despite his meticulous planning, an unforeseen event occurred that disrupted his strategy. Prior to Upton’s planned attack, Major General Governeur Warren, commander of the V Corps, made an appeal to George Meade, urging him to initiate the assault ahead of schedule at 4 p.m. Unfortunately, Warren’s attack was repelled, causing a delay in Upton’s scheduled attack time. This delay was a result of a lack of communication, as no one informed Gershom Mott, who was supposed to provide support for Upton’s assault. Consequently, Mott advanced against the tip of the Mule Shoe Salient, assuming he was coordinating with Upton, only to face defeat like Warren. Regrettably, Upton remained unaware of Mott’s failed attempt.
Finally, at 6:10 p.m. on May 10, 1864, Upton’s men commenced their assault. Upton led a force of twelve regiments against the salient. His men advanced in a line of columns, with rifles unloaded, bayonets fixed, and marching at a rapid pace. Initially, their attack successfully penetrated the center of the Mule Shoe, but the intense fighting that ensued made it difficult to hold the ground. The success of the assault relied heavily on the supporting regiments also launching their attacks to secure the salient. However, due to the allocation of all available troops to other fronts, Upton’s supporting regiments were unable to join the assault. As a result, Upton was compelled to withdraw his forces due to the enemy’s artillery fire and the increasing arrival of Confederate reinforcements.
Upton ordered the artillery bombardment of the line he was going to attack. He readied his men to charge 200 yards across an open field. Realizing that advances in musketry had made obsolete the centuries-old infantry tactic of having troops attack in a long line, firing—and being slaughtered—as they went, he chose a different approach. Upton decided that his brigade would rush the enemy fortifications in columns, without slowing to stop and fire. The idea was to reach the enemy as quickly as possible.
Upton’s forces managed to breach the first two lines of advanced rifle pits, successfully overpowering the defenders. Upton’s attack carried the first two lines of advanced rifle pits but became bogged down within the main Confederate position. Engaging in intense hand-to-hand combat, the attacking units resorted to bayonets and rifle butts as they struggled to unleash volleys of fire. The lack of command and coordination within the attacking units made it difficult to sustain the assault. While waiting for reinforcements, it became evident that the timing of Mott’s support attack was premature, resulting in a disjointed and piecemeal offensive. Ultimately, they were overpowered and had to retreat.. It was clear that had his support group charged with him, he would have held the position.
Despite the ultimate failure of the assault, Upton’s innovative approach to advancing against entrenched positions garnered recognition and praise. His promotion to brigadier general on the same evening highlighted the significance of his strategic breakthrough. The linear infantry attack, a centuries-old tactic, was rendered obsolete by Upton’s successful demonstration of a more effective method. Grant, observing the battle, gained valuable insights from Upton’s assault, which influenced his subsequent plans 2 days later. Building upon Upton’s concept, Hancock modified and implemented the columnar assault strategy.
Burnside, positioned on the far left, made an advance along the Fredericksburg Road. However, the Union command was unaware of the fact that Lee had left only Wilcox’s division to defend the eastern flank when he moved to cover the Po. This lack of information was a direct consequence of the decision to send all of Sheridan’s cavalry away from the battlefield. As a result, there was a significant gap between Wilcox and Ewell. When Burnside encountered resistance from Wilcox, he hesitated and decided to entrench, despite successfully turning Lee’s right flank. Grant, realizing that Burnside was too isolated from the rest of the line, ordered him to pull back behind the Ni. That evening Grant decided that Burnside was too isolated from the rest of the line and ordered him to pull back behind the Ni. It is evident from his Memoirs that Grant realized only too late the potential opportunity he had lost.
May 11
Although the previous day’s battle had not gone well, Grant now better understood the line that Lee was defending, and he was optimistic that Upton’s innovative concept would work if supported, and if accomplished with an entire corps. To move his line around to make such an attack, he spent much of May 11 moving Hancock closer to the Mule Shoe while having Burnside attack the eastern side of the salient.
Grant’s optimism is encapsulated in his often-cited report to Secretary Stanton that although his losses were high, so were the enemies, and that “…I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.”
Meanwhile, Lee received reports suggesting that Grant was preparing to withdraw to Fredericksburg. In anticipation of a potential pursuit, Lee ordered the withdrawal of artillery from the Mule Shoe. Amidst a heavy downpour, General Allegheny Johnson’s men could hear the noise created by Hancock’s troops. Initially, this noise was interpreted as a sign of withdrawal, but suspicions arose, leading to the order for the artillery to return. Unfortunately, this order was not received until 3:30 am on May 12, a mere 12 hours before Hancock’s assault.
Yellow Tavern
On May 11, General J.E.B. Stuart and the Confederate cavalry made a stand against the advancing Union cavalry near Yellow Tavern, which was located six miles north of Richmond. The Union troops, under the command of General Philip Sheridan, greatly outnumbered the Confederate forces, with a two-to-one advantage. The battle resulted in heavy casualties on both sides, but ultimately, Sheridan’s men emerged victorious. The Confederacy suffered a significant blow as General Stuart was mortally wounded during the battle.
May 12
General Grant assembled a force of 20,000 soldiers from the Second Corps, positioning them opposite the tip of the salient. General Lee, recognizing the movement of the Federal troops, mistakenly believed that Grant was preparing to retreat. Consequently, he ordered the removal of his artillery from the area. The attack on May 12th involved nearly 24 hours of intense hand-to-hand combat, among the fiercest witnessed during the Civil War. The assault, based on the strategy developed by Upton, was executed by multiple corps against a better-prepared, albeit somewhat surprised, Army of Northern Virginia. Although the assault was scheduled to commence at 4 am, it was delayed by over half an hour due to heavy rain and thick mist.
Hancock’s men serendipitously struck the Confederate line where mainly infantry remained. Now called the Bloody Angle, recent analysis has shown that if the attack had occurred on time, no artillery was in the salient at that time. Barlow’s division swung around to the eastern tip of the Mule Shoe, overpowering the brigade under the command of Brig. Gen. George “Maryland” Steuart. This successful maneuver resulted in the capture of both Steuart and his division commander, Allegheny Johnson. On the right side of Barlow’s division, Brig. Gen. David B. Birney’s division encountered stronger resistance from the brigades led by Col. William Monaghan and Brig. Gen. James A. Walker, famously known as the Stonewall Brigade. Despite the Confederates’ gunpowder being compromised by the rain, they fiercely engaged in close combat. The Union troops continued their advance southward along the western edge of the Mule Shoe.
The attack had breached the lines again and took thousands of rebel prisoners. The Stonewall Brigade was crushed by the initial attack with many killed and captured. . Only 200 men escaped the onslaught and the Brigade was dissolved into a single regiment for the rest of the war. The attack would have been devastating if it weren’t for the quick thinking and reaction of Confederate Gen. John Gordon, who ordered his men to shore up the Stonewall brigades sector and to seal off the center to prevent a bigger breakthrough. Burnside was ordered to attack on the left side of Barlow’s Division to pin down and expand the breakthrough, but as in previous assaults, Burnside was halted by Confederate reinforcements; another attack around 2 PM resulted in a stalemate because both Burnside and the Confederate troops attacked each other at the same time.
Although the initial success in dismantling a significant portion of the Mule Shoe salient was achieved, a flaw in the Union plan became apparent: there had been no strategic consideration on how to capitalize on this breakthrough. The 15,000 infantrymen from Hancock’s II Corps became concentrated within a narrow front, approximately half a mile wide, resulting in the loss of unit cohesion. Consequently, they devolved into little more than an armed mob. As Grant continued to deploy additional troops against the Confederate defenses, Lee swiftly shifted reinforcements into the salient.
General Lee personally observed the progress of his troops as they moved forward. Just like in the advance at the Widow Tapp farm during the Battle of the Wilderness, Lee tried to advance and lead his soldiers. However, he was prevented from exposing himself by Gordon and the soldiers’ repeated chants of “Lee to the rear” defense, while Brig. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur’s brigade suffered significant losses as they valiantly fought to reclaim the entrenchments previously lost by the Stonewall Brigade. After approximately half an hour of intense combat, these brigades successfully secured a substantial portion of the eastern section of the Mule Shoe.
The assault led by Warren at Laurel Hill commenced on a modest scale around 8:15 a.m. Unfortunately, for some of his soldiers, this marked their fourth or fifth attempt at capturing the same objective, resulting in a lack of enthusiasm. After thirty minutes, the attack gradually lost momentum. Meade, recognizing the urgency, commanded Warren to launch an immediate and all-out assault, even if it meant utilizing his entire force. However, the attack proved futile, as the Union corps encountered fierce resistance from a lone Confederate division. Not only did the V Corps fail to achieve its objective, but it also failed to divert Confederate troops from other areas of the front, contrary to Grant’s intentions. Grant granted Meade the authority to relieve Warren of his duties, proposing that Meade’s chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, assume command. Nevertheless, Humphreys skillfully coordinated the withdrawal of the V Corps units without actually relieving Warren from his position.
At approximately 6:30 am, Grant issued orders for additional troops to launch an assault on the Bloody Angle, which was the northwestern section of the salient situated closest to Union lines. In response, Confederate forces dispatched more troops to counterattack, and the line was fortified with artillery. Consequently, the battle evolved into a gruesome deadlock, with the combat persisting relentlessly for nearly 24 hours. The engagement was characterized by intense close-quarter fighting. Meanwhile, both Warren and Burnside made renewed attempts to attack their respective sections of the line, but their efforts yielded minimal results.
As the fighting raged on at the Bloody Angle, Confederate engineers hastily worked to establish a fresh defensive line approximately 500 yards southward, positioned at the base of the Mule Shoe. The conflict at the Bloody Angle persisted incessantly day and night, with neither side gaining a decisive advantage, until the fighting eventually ceased around midnight on May 13. At 4 A.M., the fatigued Confederate infantrymen were informed that the newly constructed line was prepared, prompting them to withdraw gradually from the original earthworks, unit by unit.
May 13-16
From this point forward, the battle became an attempt on both sides to find an advantageous place to strike; neither found one. Grant shifted Warren and Wright to his left to find an attacking capability from the Fredericksburg and Massoponax Church Roads. With the diminished Mule Show now the de facto center of the line, Lee shifter Anderson from his left to meet the new threat from the east. It rained a great deal of the time which prevented any massing of troops to make a determined attack.
May 17-18
Lee having shifted his men back from the left to cover his right, Grant then waited for two days of dry weather to bring Wright and Hancock back to the area of the Mule Shoe, now anchoring the Confederate left. But Ewell’s men were still there and had entrenched further. No progress was made.
May 19-21
Having once again been stopped by Lee, Grant tried a deception. He ordered Hancock to move to the railroad line and move south hoping that Lee would follow, unentrenched. when Grant would attack the rear. Grant ordered Hancock to pull back toward the Fredericksburg Road. Observing the movement, Lee sent Richard S. Ewell’s Second Corps forward as a reconnaissance force to determine where the Federals were going. Ewell’s men run into stiff resistance by a brigade of new heavy artillery-turned-infantry regiments at the Harris family farm. But Lee didn’t fall into the trap and discerned that Grant was once again planning on a southeast movement to the North Anna River.
Grant meeting with his staff during the Overland Campaign at Massaponax Church, May 21,1864 by Timothy O’Sullivan, Library of Congress
Summary
The fighting at Spotsylvania was perhaps the most brutal of the war, with hand-to-hand combat of vicious severity on both sides, especially at the Mule Shoe. Despite lasting for two weeks, the battle ended inconclusively from a tactical standpoint. Interestingly, both the Confederacy and the Union claimed victory. The Confederacy believed they had emerged victorious due to their ability to hold their defenses, while the Union saw it as their triumph because their offensive continued and General Lee’s army suffered irreplaceable losses.
*****
Casualties
Union: 100,000-110,000 Total
Casualties and losses: Total: 18,399 (2,725 killed, 13,416 wounded, 2,258 captured or missing)
Confederates: 50,000–63,000 Total
Casualties and losses: Total: 12,687 (1,515 killed, 5,414 wounded, 5,758 captured or missing)
*****
In terms of percentages, the battle could be considered a draw, but when looking at absolute numbers, the Union paid a heavy price. The initial stages of the battle were unfavorable for the Union forces, with the disastrous outcome at Laurel Hill and the delayed and poorly supported attacks on May 9th. General Grant’s army suffered substantial casualties during the battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House. Between May 5 and May 12, the Army of the Potomac experienced approximately 32,000 casualties, surpassing the combined casualties of all Union armies in any previous week of the war. Contributing to the carnage were advances in weaponry that by 1864 had outstripped the Napoleonic warfare of the day. The result was massive casualties: on May 12 alone, Lee lost eight thousand men; Grant, nine thousand.
However, it was the Mule Shoe attacks that inflicted significant damage on the Confederates, resulting in the capture of many soldiers. Due to the suspension of prisoner exchanges, these men would never return to the fight. After suffering severe casualties in the Wilderness, Lee had no choice but to curb his aggressive instincts and prepare for a defensive battle at Spotsylvania. Employing advanced fieldworks that foreshadowed the trench warfare of World War I, Lee skillfully organized his exhausted veterans to defend against Grant’s relentless attacks.
Although there was no clear victor of the multi-day battle, many consider it a strategic victory for Grant. The battles inflicted proportionately higher casualties on Lee’s numerically smaller army, driving his forces into a siege at Petersburg and eventually leading him to surrender his forces at Appomattox in April 1865.
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Further Reading
· Rhea, Gordon C. The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern May 7–12, 1864. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997.
· Stephen E Ambrose, Upton and the Army. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993.
· https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/spotsylvania-court-house
· https://www.history.com/topics/american-civil-war/battle-of-spotsylvania-court-house
· https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/emory-upton