The Repression of Muslim Identity and the Rise of Conservative Islam in Bangladesh

The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian regime in 2024 marked a significant turning point in Bangladesh’s political and social landscape. After 15-plus years of tight control, repression, and centralized rule, her government was overthrown by a student-led revolution on August 5, 2024. The revolution, which culminated in Dr. Muhammad Yunus being appointed as chief adviser to the interim government on August 7, ushered in a period of liberalism, freedom of expression, and political openness. 

For the first time in years, religious symbols, public gatherings, and open discourse on faith and identity became visible, even in historically secular spaces like Dhaka University. This resurgence of religious expression, particularly the calls for an Islamic caliphate among schoolchildren and the widespread wearing of the hijab by a significant number of women – something that was not common even 20 years ago – symbolizes the deep-seated tension between secularism and Islam that has defined Bangladesh since its independence.

That said, since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, a complex interplay of political forces has contributed to the rise of conservative religiosity among the masses, a trend largely influenced by the systematic repression of Muslim identity. The imposition of secularism by the ruling elites shortly after independence, influenced by external actors like India and the Soviet Union, catalyzed a conservative backlash that has continued to shape the religious and political landscape of the country. Despite the initial imposition of secularism, Islam eventually became a central tenet of the Bangladeshi state, reflecting the deep religious inclinations of the populace. 

Over the decades, the ruling Awami League (AL) has been at the forefront of this struggle, pushing a secular Bengali nationalism that marginalized Muslim identity, leading to the rise of authoritarianism and a conservative generation that seeks an alternative in political Islam.

Imposing Secularism After 1971: A Disconnect From Popular Sentiment

After the Liberation War in 1971, Bangladesh emerged as an independent state, shedding its identity as East Pakistan. The Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, assumed power and began to lay the foundations of the new nation. 

Influenced by the socialist and secular ideologies of its allies, India and the Soviet Union, the new government prioritized secularism in its nation-building project. Bengali nationalism, based on ethnicity and language, became the dominant ideology, with secularism being imposed from the top down as a way to distance the country from its previous association with Islamic Pakistan.

However, this imposition of secularism did not resonate with the deeply religious population of Bangladesh. Islam had been a significant part of the cultural and spiritual fabric of the people, and the abrupt secularization policies alienated large segments of the population. The rapid transition from being a part of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to a secular state created a disconnect between the political elites and the masses. This discontent did not take long to manifest, as evidenced by the swift reversal of secularism in Bangladesh’s Constitution.

In the late 1970s, just a few years after independence, secularism was replaced with the principle of absolute faith and trust in Allah, and in the 1980s, Islam was declared the state religion. This shift highlighted the enduring religious inclinations of the population and the failure of the early post-independence government to create a secular identity for Bangladesh. It also demonstrated that attempts to impose secularism, without the consent or gradual acceptance of the masses, were doomed to fail.

The Awami League’s Secular Nationalism and the Marginalization of Muslim Identity

From the very beginning, the AL has been the primary force behind the promotion of secular Bengali nationalism. Under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and later his daughter, Sheikh Hasina, the party sought to establish an identity for Bangladesh that was distinct from both Pakistan and the global Muslim ummah. Bengali nationalism, which emphasized language and ethnicity, was used as a unifying force, but it came at the cost of marginalizing the Muslim identity that many Bangladeshis cherished.

Mujib’s vision of secularism and Bengali nationalism was aimed at creating a modern, progressive state. However, the implementation of these ideas often led to the suppression of Islamic expressions in public life. His daughter, Hasina, took this vision to its full realization when she assumed power in January 2009. 

Over the years, the AL government has pushed for secularism, with a clear agenda to undermine the role of Islam in the public sphere. This secularization effort, however, was not entirely benign. By promoting Bengali nationalism as the dominant identity, the government alienated those who identified more closely with their Islamic faith than with their Bengali ethnicity. 

This alienation became particularly acute when Hasina’s government began to promote a form of cultural secularism that equated religious festivals with national unity. One notable instance was when Hasina referred to Durga Puja, a major Hindu festival, as a “universal” celebration, thus framing Hindu religious traditions as representative of the national culture, while the Islamic traditions remained confined to the private sphere.

The slogan “religion is personal, but festivals are for all,” (dharma jar jar, utsab sober) popularized by the AL, further exacerbated this marginalization. While it suggested that all religious festivals should be celebrated by everyone, in practice, Muslim festivals did not receive the same state promotion or universal recognition as Hindu festivals. This unequal treatment of religious identities in public life led to a growing sense of disenfranchisement among the Muslim majority, who felt their religious identity was being undermined in favor of secular nationalism.

The marginalization of Muslim identity has been particularly visible in educational institutions, where there has been an informal but systematic repression of Islamic expressions. Over the past few decades, universities have increasingly restricted Muslim religious gatherings, often discouraging students from engaging in public displays of religiosity. Islamic dress, particularly the niqab, has also been questioned in these institutions, further marginalizing Muslim women who choose to express their faith through their clothing.

These policies have contributed to a perception that Muslim identity is under attack, particularly when compared to the relatively open promotion of other cultural and religious practices. This perceived repression has had profound effects on the youth, many of whom have turned to conservative interpretations of Islam as a form of resistance. 

The Global Context: The War on Terror and the Rise of Conservative Islam

The AL’s position on secularism and its marginalization of Muslim identity has been aided by the broader global context, particularly the United States’ global War on Terror. In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. and its allies, including Bangladesh, adopted policies aimed at curbing Islamic extremism. However, in many cases, these policies disproportionately targeted Muslim populations and contributed to the repression of Islamic expressions in public life.

In Bangladesh, the War on Terror provided the AL with a pretext to further suppress Islamic identity, particularly in the context of political opposition. Islamist parties and groups, including Jamaat-e-Islami, were often portrayed as threats to national security, justifying crackdowns on their activities. While these actions were framed as efforts to combat extremism, they also served to delegitimize Islamic political expressions and further alienate the Muslim population.

Ironically, this repression has contributed to the rise of conservative religiosity, as many young Muslims began to see political Islam, particularly the concept of a caliphate, as a viable alternative to the neoliberal and secular frameworks promoted by the state. In the 1980s, many youths in Bangladesh were drawn to socialism and communism as ideologies of resistance against imperialism and capitalism. However, in the wake of the global spread of neoliberalism and the ongoing struggle of Muslims in places like Palestine, Muslim youth have increasingly turned to conservative Islam as a counternarrative. 

The Shift Toward a Conservative Society

The systematic repression of Muslim identity by the AL has paradoxically led to the rise of a more conservative society. While the government has pushed for secularism and Bengali nationalism, these efforts have alienated a significant portion of the population, particularly the youth. Many young people, frustrated by the marginalization of their religious identity and disillusioned by the failures of neoliberalism, have turned to Islam as a source of empowerment and resistance.

In the face of secularization policies, the younger generation has increasingly embraced conservative religious practices, with the hijab becoming a common expression of Islamic identity among women, and calls for the establishment of a caliphate (khilafat) gaining traction. Young Bangladeshis, in particular, has become more vocal in their demands for a caliphate, seeing it as an alternative to the secular and authoritarian rule of the AL. 

The repression of Muslim identity in Bangladesh since 1971 has been a significant factor in the rise of conservative religiosity among the population. The initial imposition of secularism by the ruling elites, influenced by India and the Soviet Union, alienated the deeply religious masses and contributed to a conservative backlash. Over the decades, the Awami League has continued to promote secular Bengali nationalism, marginalizing Muslim identity and fostering resentment among the population. This marginalization, combined with the global context of the War on Terror, has led to the rise of a conservative generation that increasingly sees political Islam as a viable alternative to the secular, neoliberal state. 

Today, Bangladesh stands at a crossroads, with the tension between secularism and conservative Islam shaping the future of the nation.