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General Ulysses Grant had surreptitiously moved his army and navy south of Vicksburg and created diversions to keep the Confederate commander Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton from knowing his whereabouts. But now, he had to cross the Mississippi River to be on the same side of the river as Vicksburg. Porter effectively managed to relocate steamships and transport vessels from the northern region of Vicksburg to where Grant’s troops were stationed, ready for transportation across the river. Grant’s infantry had advanced southward, and with an abundance of supplies and river transports, the Union Army was finally able to cross the Mississippi River. The Federal landing at Bruinsburg, Mississippi, on April 30, 1863, and the ensuing victory at the Battle of Port Gibson the next day were the start of Grant’s movement toward Vicksburg.
However, the crossing did not unfold as smoothly as anticipated.
Grant’s initial strategy to land at Grand Gulf was thwarted by a Confederate division that had fortified the area, and even a bombardment by Union ironclads failed to dislodge them. Consequently, Grant instructed Porter and McClernand to facilitate a crossing at Grand Gulf, Mississippi. On the morning of April 29, McClernand embarked his troops on transports at Hard Times, awaiting Porter’s gunboats to weaken the Confederate stronghold. Following a five-hour battle, the Confederate forces emerged victorious as Porter’s vessels retreated, sustaining casualties in the process. The Battle of Grand Gulf ended in a Confederate victory when Porter’s vessels withdrew after losing 19 killed and 56 wounded.
McClernand unloaded his soldiers and marched them south to De Shroon’s (or Disharoon) plantation, located about 5 miles north of Bruinsburg on the west bank of the Mississippi River. That night, Porter’s gunboats and the transports ran the Grand Gulf batteries and joined McClernand’s men at De Shroon’s. Grant arrived on April 29 and devised a new plan to disembark his soldiers at Rodney, Mississippi, located around 12 miles downstream. However, a fortuitous encounter with an escaped slave led Grant to Bruinsburg, a port with excellent steamboat facilities and a convenient road leading up the bluffs east of the river. Upon arrival, the soldiers found the port nearly deserted, with only a local farmer as a witness to their invasion.
Battle of Port Gibson
The Battle of Port Gibson began with the landing of 17,000 Union soldiers at Bruinsburg, Grant’s army, after successfully crossing the river, proceeded towards their initial target, Port Gibson, located approximately ten miles east of Bruinsburg. This strategic location held control over the local road network, making it a crucial objective for the advancing Union forces. The skirmishes between the Union army and Confederate outposts lasted for three hours on May 1, before escalating into a full-fledged battle at dawn.
The challenging terrain initially favored the Confederate defense, characterized by flat-topped ridges and steep ravines. The ridge-tops were devoid of trees, while the ravines were densely covered with vegetation, making off-road movements arduous. Centers Creek, situated between the Bruinsburg and Rodney roads, posed a significant obstacle due to its near-impassable nature. McClernand, overseeing the attack with Porter’s assistance, navigated the challenging terrain to lead the Union forces toward their objective.
Under McClernand’s command, the Union forces encountered solid Confederate defense, with Brig Gen Martin Green leading the main brigade. However, the tide turned when Logan managed to flank the Confederate right, compelling the defenders to retreat. The unexpected arrival of Union forces in the evening led to a rare night battle, with Green requesting support from the Rebel right flank. Just as reinforcements arrived from Vicksburg, Osterhaus launched an attack on the Confederate right flank, further destabilizing their defense. The Confederates continued to fall back and establish new defensive positions at different times during the day. Eventually, they conceded and left the field in the early evening. The collapse of the Confederate line following Logan’s assault prompted a retreat, ultimately resulting in the fall of Port Gibson and Grant’s subsequent advancement inland. Grant was now in control of Port Gibson and Grand Gulf.
Grant’s defeat of the garrison at Port Gibson forced the abandonment of the defenses at Grand Gulf. Pemberton was caught with his army scattered and could only oppose Grant with inferior forces at Port Gibson. The battle allowed control of the entire area where the Union army needed to cross the river and start its movement.
Grant was faced with a critical decision at this stage, as he had multiple options available to him. One possibility was to launch an attack on Vicksburg from both the south and the east. Another option was to collaborate with General Banks, seize Port Hudson, and then proceed to march on Vicksburg as a combined force. However, Grant was well aware of Banks’ incompetence and had no intention of allowing him to disrupt their operations. If Grant had chosen to join forces with Banks, he would have been subordinate to him, which he strongly opposed.
Consequently, Grant had to carefully consider his next move. Although his orders, or at least Halleck’s plan, were to rendezvous with General Banks and capture Port Hudson before jointly assaulting Vicksburg, Grant decided to deviate from these instructions. Instead, he sent a message to Halleck, informing him that Banks was currently engaged in his own operations, and that waiting for him to finish would require waiting another month. Instead, Grant made the deliberate choice to advance independently, fully aware that it would take approximately 8 days for his message to be received and a response to be given. By avoiding the collaboration with Banks, Grant was able to pursue his own plans without any hindrance. As a result, he found himself in a favorable position to accept the surrender of Pemberton, while Banks remained stationed at Port Hudson.
The Move Inland
Once the areas on the river crossings were in Union control, Confederate forces situated between the Big Bayou Pierre and the Big Black River found themselves in a compromised position. Recognizing this vulnerability, the Confederate troops swiftly moved towards Hankinson’s Ferry across the Big Black River. At this juncture, Grant’s original plan was to feign a move north along the same path as a diversion to threaten a direct advance toward Vicksburg. However, reconnaissance revealed that Pemberton had established formidable defensive positions to the south of the city.
Consequently, on May 7th, Grant made a strategic decision that would later be regarded as one of the most brilliant maneuvers of the war. He opted to disrupt the city’s supply line by capturing the railroad connecting Jackson to Vicksburg. This route involved a shift towards the east, with the ultimate objective of turning west to launch an assault on Vicksburg. By cutting off the town’s supply lines, its strategic advantages were transformed into vulnerabilities.
Rather than taking a direct approach towards Vicksburg from the southern front, Grant led his army in a northeasterly direction, utilizing the protection of the Big Black River on his left flank. The plan was to target the Southern Railroad of Mississippi between Vicksburg and Jackson. Severing this vital transportation link would cut Pemberton’s supply chains and communication networks, effectively isolating Vicksburg. As the Union forces advanced inland, each corps was strategically positioned, with McClernand’s on the left, Sherman’s in the center, and McPherson’s on the right. However, the further Grant’s army moved inland, the more susceptible they became to potential attacks.
The Supply Line
The crucial question of the whole campaign is how Grant would supply his army. Grant established a base at Grand Gulf on the Mississippi River to support the army’s advancement inland. This supply base played a crucial role in sustaining the Union Army’s movements in Mississippi. However, it is important to note that Grant did not completely sever his supply line when he reached Vicksburg and reconnected with the fleet on the Yazoo River. It is a misconception, often perpetuated by modern narratives, that Grant was without a supply line. Grant actually established and effectively maintained a main supply route throughout his movement toward Vicksburg.
General Sherman expressed apprehensions regarding Grant’s logistical planning, deeming it insufficient and vulnerable to attacks. Grant, in opting for an indirect approach to Vicksburg by targeting the railroad east of the city. necessitated a longer and riskier supply route. This choice prompted Sherman to caution Grant about the potential challenges of maintaining such a large army with limited resources. Grant’s response reflected his reliance on utilizing available provisions and sourcing the rest from the surrounding area. Sherman on May 9 warned Grant: “There are over 500 wagons across the river … Stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quickly as possible, for this road will be jammed as sure as life if you attempt to supply 50,000 men by one single road.” Grant replied, “I do not calculate the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf … What I do expect, however, is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance.”
The myth of Grant’s cutting loose from his supply base began when Charles Dana, a former reporter who accompanied Grant’s army as an observer for the Secretary of War, wrote back to Washington on May 4, 1863: “As soon as Sherman comes up and the rations on the way arrive, he [Grant] will disregard his base and depend upon the country for meat and even for bread.” In 1867 Adam Badeau, a former Grant staff officer, published the first volume of his three-volume Military History of General U. S. Grant. Badeau wrote that “[Grant] at once decided to abandon his base altogether, to plunge into the enemy’s country with three days rations, trusting to the region itself for forage and supplies.” A year later, in The Personal History of U. S. Grant, Albert Richardson compared Grant’s Vicksburg Campaign with “Scott’s brilliant campaign from Puebla to Mexico,” and wrote that Grant “determined to abandon his base.”
However, Grant himself refuted these claims during an interview in 1879 with a New York Herald reporter, clarifying that he did not sever ties with his supply base during the Vicksburg Campaign. Grant said that, as his troops crossed the Mississippi on April 29 and 30, he “had rations in abundance on board the transports, but no transportation for them into the interior.” He said he did not abandon his base but “directed the officers to gather all the wagons and teams they could from the plantations as we moved on.” He explained that while his troops had ample rations upon crossing the Mississippi, there was a lack of transportation for these supplies. Grant emphasized the importance of maintaining a supply line for essential items that could not be procured from the local environment, such as ammunition, coffee, bread, salt, and sugar.
But, when writing his Personal Memoirs in 1885, more than 22 years after the conclusion of the Vicksburg Campaign, his account of the supply line issue added to the confusion. Grant supported the myth that he had decided to abandon his supply base at Grand Gulf on May 3 by stating, “I determined to move independently of Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in Vicksburg and invest or capture the city.” This statement was almost identical to one he had previously written for an article in Century magazine in July of 1884, which was published in 1885 and later included in the four-volume Battles and Leaders of the Civil War in 1887. Grant’s use of the phrase “cut loose from my base” at Grand Gulf on May 3, often cited by authors and historians, contradicts his own words eight pages later. Grant recalled that on May 12, at Dillon’s farm, he decided to redirect his columns towards Jackson. He wrote, “But by moving against Jackson, I uncovered my own communication. So I finally decided to have none — to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward. I then had no fears for my communications, and if I turned quickly enough could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me in the rear.” Therefore, it becomes clear that Grant intended to secure his communications, rather than solely focusing on food supplies.
The Battle of Raymond
Grant devised a new strategy on May 7th, opting for an indirect approach rather than a direct assault on Pemberton’s forces south of Vicksburg. Instead of crossing the Big Black River and heading north, Grant planned to reach the railroad east of Vicksburg and approach from that direction. This plan, however, came with its own set of risks and challenges, as it required a longer line of supply. Despite the potential difficulties, Grant’s army continued to move northeastward towards the railroad on May 11th, while General McClernand expressed concerns about the enemy isolating the Union army by cutting off their supply line.
Grant intended to first cut off the railroad before launching an attack on Vicksburg. As his forces drew closer to the railroad, Grant discovered that Pemberton had already begun constructing fortifications to protect it. It became evident that Vicksburg had strong defenses in the southern part of the city and a well-established supply line from Jackson via the railroad. Grant believed that the enemy was positioned to the north, defending the railroad.
Pemberton suspected that Grant’s primary target was the railroad. In response, he strategically positioned his troops along the entire line from Warrenton to Bovina, constructing fortifications at key points. As Grant’s intentions became more apparent, Pemberton extended his line of defense to Edwards Station and fortified that area as well. However, this left the rail centers at Bolton and Clinton vulnerable. To address this, Pemberton ordered reinforcements arriving from the south and east to march to Raymond, where they would form the left wing of his army, guarding the north-south roads that connected the rail line from Jackson to Vicksburg. Pemberton planned to strike Grant in the flank if he attacked Edwards Station or the Big Black Bridge. If Grant turned toward Jackson, Pemberton would strike him in the flank and rear as he passed.
Many renderings of the Battle of Raymond suggest that Johnston was in command in Jackson at this time. In fact, on May 10, he is not present in the vicinity, having just been appointed commander. He was en route; Johnston wasn’t even appointed until May 9 and didn’t arrive until May 13; at that point, McPherson was already positioned between the two Confederate armies.
Pemberton knew that reinforcements were gathering in Jackson. So, on May 10 he ordered them all to a small town called Raymond about 20 miles southwest of Jackson.
General John Gregg led a brigade to Raymond with the intention of ambushing a Union advance party, despite his limited military experience as a Texas politician. However, faulty intelligence led him to believe he would only face a small contingent of Union troops. After an exhausting 200-mile march from Port Hudson, Gregg’s 3,000-man brigade arrived in Jackson on May 9th, only to be ordered to march 19 miles to Raymond after a day of rest. Arriving late in the afternoon on May 11th, his men were so fatigued that they dropped to rest where they stood.
Meanwhile, Grant had authorized McPherson to begin his march toward Jackson on the same day. Gregg, under explicit orders to not engage a larger force, was supposed to withdraw slowly toward Jackson while alerting Pemberton for a coordinated strike. However, McPherson’s strategic deployment of troops lured Gregg into a pitched battle by concealing his forces and showing only Logan’s 2nd Brigade up the road. This tactical maneuver led to Gregg’s brigade being drawn into a confrontation, McPherson then had the 1st and 3rd Brigades march through the woods unseen. Once Logan’s entire division was in place, he ordered the men forward.
At approximately 10:30 am, McPherson issued the command to move forward. The 23rd Indiana, known for their skills as skirmishers, defied orders and crossed the creek ahead of the federal line, unknowingly setting off the Confederate ambush. Overwhelmed by the two Confederate regiments, the Hoosiers fled with the Confederates in pursuit. The Confederates, in turn, chased the Indiana troops across the creek only to be met by a hidden federal infantry brigade. A complex and chaotic engagement developed as three Confederate regiments emerged from the woods after chasing away a cavalry picket only to find that the force they had been ordered to encircle was two federal brigades. Although some accounts suggest McPherson sent in his men in waves, perhaps due to weather conditions, others say he was hiding his deployment from Gregg to deceive him.
Gregg found himself in a challenging situation as he attempted to disengage from the fight. By 4 pm, he finally managed to regroup his forces and ordered a retreat. However, amid the chaos, Gregg failed to communicate the unfolding events to Pemberton, leaving a gap in the Confederate command structure and strategic coordination.
As Gregg retreated through Raymond, reinforcements began to arrive to cover his withdrawal, including cavalry regiments, infantry units, and a brigade from Georgia. With approximately 5,000 men on the field, McPherson’s forces were consolidating towards the fortifications being constructed in Jackson. The opposing forces clashed at Fourteen Mile Creek, where Gregg attempted to halt the Union army’s advance. Despite initial success in causing heavy casualties, the Confederate troops were eventually outmatched by the Union’s superior numbers and firepower, leading to a strategic retreat back to Jackson.
General Joseph Johnston and Jackson MS
Grant’s strategic plan revolved around disrupting the railway supply route that connected Vicksburg to Jackson. The primary objective was to prevent potential attacks from General Johnston, who was stationed in Jackson, that could have resulted in Grant’s forces being trapped between Johnston and Pemberton. To execute this plan, Grant made adjustments by instructing McClernand and Sherman to hold Pemberton in position while McPherson swiftly advanced from the rear to capture the state capital. This tactical maneuver aimed to sever Pemberton’s supply line and weaken the defenses of Vicksburg, ultimately allowing McPherson to rejoin Grant’s forces.
On May 14, 1863, Grant redirected his army towards the east to force General Johnston’s forces away from Jackson. Johnston, with the majority of his army, retreated along the Canton Road. This retreat prevented Johnston from joining forces with Pemberton, who was now isolated in Vicksburg. With Johnston out of the picture, Grant shifted his focus back to Vicksburg. Once the Union forces gained control of the capital, communication between Pemberton and General Johnston was severed, further isolating Pemberton’s troops.
In response to Johnston’s orders, Pemberton, commanding approximately 23,000 men divided into three divisions, was instructed to leave Edwards Station and launch an attack on the Union troops at Clinton. However, Pemberton and his generals believed that Johnston’s plan would likely lead to disaster. Instead, they decided to divert their attention and attack the Union supply trains en route from Grand Gulf to Raymond. On May 16, Pemberton received another message from Johnston reiterating his previous orders. Unfortunately, Pemberton had already set off after the supply trains and found himself on the Raymond-Edwards Road, with his rear positioned at a crossroads just south of the crest of Champion Hill. As a result, when Pemberton obediently ordered a countermarch, his rear, including the supply wagons, inadvertently became the vanguard of his attack.
Battle of Champion Hill
The Battle of Champion Hill, which took place on May 16, 1863, marked a significant turning point in the Vicksburg Campaign. It was a critical moment for Pemberton, as he had one last opportunity to fend off Grant’s forces. However, his confusion during this crucial juncture ultimately sealed his fate. With his troops outnumbered 32,000 to 22,000, Pemberton formed a defensive line along a ridge that overlooked Jackson Creek. This defensive position covered the Middle Road and Raymond Road to the south.
In the early morning of May 13, the three divisions of Generals Bowen, Loring, and Stevenson marched out from the Black River fortifications and began their strike toward what Pemberton hoped was the rear supply line of the Federal Army. More importantly, Grant knew Pemberton was coming. One of the messengers between Johnston and Pemberton was actually a Union operative who turned over his messages to General McPherson, who in turn reported the information to Grant. On the morning of May 16, 1863, the rebels met, not Grant’s supply line as expected, but most of his Federal Army at a place known as Champion’s Hill.
The situation became precarious for Pemberton when General Stephen D. Lee, stationed atop Champion Hill, alerted him to a Union column advancing on the Jackson Road. This Union movement threatened to cut off the Southern forces from Edwards Station and the vital route to Vicksburg. In response, Pemberton shifted his troops northward to protect the hill and the Jackson Road.
Grant, on the other hand, ordered attacks by Logan and Hovey, while John A. McClernand’s corps launched an assault on Pemberton’s left flank, and James B. McPherson’s corps attacked from the right. Despite the excellent defense provided by Stephen Lee, the Union forces managed to seize the crest of the hill around 1 PM. McPherson’s corps continued to advance, capturing a crucial crossroads and effectively closing off the escape route via the Jackson Road.
Although a counterattack by Bowen’s division briefly pushed the Federals back beyond the Champion Hill crest, they were unable to maintain their position due to insufficient numbers. Recognizing the dire situation, Grant launched a counterattack, committing all of his forces. Pemberton’s men were unable to withstand this assault, prompting him to order his troops to utilize the only remaining escape route, the Raymond Road crossing of Bakers Creek.
McPherson on the right (north) flank fought the lion’s share of the battle. His casualties constituted the bulk of the Union losses, about 2,500. The Confederates suffered about 3,800 casualties, perhaps half were captured. Grant criticized the lack of fighting spirit of McClernand, his rival for Union Army leadership. McClernand had delayed his attack and then was stopped by a smaller force. McClernand’s casualties were low on the Union left flank (south). Sherman and the others wanted to see him gone, but Grant counseled a different course of action.
The decision made by General Pemberton regarding the abandonment of Vicksburg, as ordered by General Johnston, remains a pivotal question in the context of the entire war. This question not only fueled a post-war dispute between Pemberton and Johnston but also subjected Pemberton to enduring criticism. On one hand, General Johnston displayed little confidence in defending Vicksburg and instead advocated for the merging of Pemberton’s forces with his own. By uniting their armies, Johnston believed they could confront Grant’s troops in an open battle and subsequently allocate their forces to other vulnerable areas of the Confederacy. Conversely, Confederate President Jefferson Davis consistently emphasized the importance of safeguarding Vicksburg at all costs, leaving Pemberton torn between conflicting directives. It is crucial to acknowledge the challenging position Pemberton found himself in, torn between the expectations of his military and civilian superiors.
However, fair criticism can be directed towards Pemberton for his slow response, failure to anticipate Grant’s movements and lack of coordination with Johnston. Attempting to appease both his military and civilian superiors proved to be an impossible mission. The complexities of the situation, coupled with the pressure to please conflicting authorities, hindered Pemberton’s ability to make swift and strategic decisions. While it is understandable that he could not simply disregard the orders of his president, the consequences of his indecisiveness and lack of proactive measures were significant. Pemberton’s retreat from Vicksburg ultimately resulted in continuing censure and placed him at the center of scrutiny for years to come.
Battle of Big Black River Bridge
Pemberton realized that his army was at a numerical disadvantage, prompting him to make the strategic decision to retreat towards the Big Black River Bridge. To buy time for the Confederate army to regroup, he assigned General William W. Loring’s division to hold Raymond Road while the rest of the troops moved north. The division under Bowen and the brigade of John C Vaughn were tasked with defending the works at the bridge, with the advantage of natural barriers such as swampy terrain and a bayou in front of them.
On the Union side, Major General John McClernand led the pursuit of the Confederates and engaged Bowen’s rear guard. A swift Union charge managed to break the Confederate position, leading to a rout during the retreat and river crossing. Many Confederate soldiers were captured in the process, while the remaining troops sought refuge within the fortifications at Vicksburg, Mississippi, marking the beginning of the siege of Vicksburg the following day.
Grant had initially planned for General Sherman to surprise Bowen and Vaughn at the Big Black River crossing at Bridgeport, seven miles away, where he could reach the west bank of the Big Black River and take Bowen and Vaughn by surprise. Meanwhile, his subordinate Gen. Michael K. Lawler had a different idea.
Martin Green’s Brigade held the Confederate left without any artillery support, while Lawler’s brigade was positioned nearby in the tree line. A scout informed Lawler of a sunken area close to the Rebel line, allowing his men to charge across open ground with minimal risk from artillery fire. Recognizing a strategic opportunity – no one was covering the river – his brigade charged a sunken area that was bisected by a marsh.
The following morning, Lawler’s Brigade took the initiative to charge the Confederate lines without explicit orders, disappearing from view after advancing 50 yards. During the charge, both sides engaged in intense artillery exchanges, resulting in General Osterhaus of Grant’s command being wounded by a Confederate shell. Meanwhile, Gen. Eugene Carr’s Division began to assemble opposite the Confederate lines.
By 9 o’clock, Lawler identified an opportune location to strike the Rebel defenses and ordered his men to charge. The Federal troops, who had seemingly vanished from sight, reemerged and swiftly advanced the remaining 50 yards to assault the gap between Martin Green’s Arkansas Brigade and Vaughn’s Tennessee Brigade. Despite facing fire from infantry and artillery as they crossed the bayou, the Federal soldiers managed to breach the Confederate breastworks and engage in close combat. Witnessing the success of Lawler’s charge, the rest of the Union line followed suit and joined the assault. Overwhelmed by the increasing number of Union infantry, the Confederates retreated, leaving behind their cannons and approximately 1,700 men who surrendered.
The significance of this small battle cannot be understated. The Confederates suffered heavy losses, with 1,751 men killed or captured, the majority of which were taken as prisoners. On the other hand, the Union casualties were relatively low, totaling around 235. This defeat at the Big Black River Bridge marked the beginning of the siege of Vicksburg.
Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman was killed in this action. To help save the army, Pemberton tasked Lloyd Tilghman’s brigade to provide a rear-guard action that cost Tilghman his life. However, this action allowed Pemberton to retreat from the area.
The general was killed by artillery fire. His teenage son was on the field and hugged his father as he died.
Following their defeat at Champion Hill, General John C. Pemberton’s forces retreated to the bridge at Big Black River, just before reaching Vicksburg. During the battle at Champion Hill, General William Loring disobeyed orders to advance, resulting in his separation from the main Confederate troops. Loring attempted to rejoin his comrades at the bridge, but the difficult terrain forced him to abandon most of his supplies and artillery. Local civilians warned Loring that a large Union force stood between him and the rendezvous point at Big Black. Instead of engaging Grant’s forces, Loring decided to redirect his path and join the Confederate forces at Canton. Unbeknownst to Pemberton, who was unaware of Loring’s change in direction, he ordered John Bowen’s Division and John Vaughn’s Brigade to defend the works at Big Black River Bridge, to buy time. Had Pemberton been aware of Loring’s retreat, he may have reconsidered engaging in battle at that location, as it was intended to serve as a rear guard action for Loring. Loring’s strained relationship with Pemberton was well-known, as he had difficulty working with his superiors. Despite this, Loring consistently displayed courage and honor in battle, proving himself time and time again. Instead of retreating to Vicksburg, Loring eventually reached Johnston’s army. The feud between Loring and Pemberton over these actions persisted long after the war had ended.
Retreat into Vicksburg
Following the resounding Union victories at the Battle of Champion Hill and the Battle of Big Black River Bridge, Pemberton found himself cornered within the City of Vicksburg. With Sherman’s corps threatening to flank him from the north, Pemberton had no choice but to either engage in battle or entrench himself within the city. The siege of Vicksburg commenced on May 18 and lasted about 6 weeks.
As the Confederates retreated, they resorted to burning the railroad bridge over the Big Black River and a steamboat serving as a bridge. By detonating incendiary devices on the bridges, they thwarted Grant’s pursuit attempts. Although Vicksburg had not yet fallen to Grant’s forces, the city was effectively cut off from the outside world. Pemberton and his troops were trapped within the confines of Vicksburg, buying them time but offering no escape route.
With dwindling troops and no external connections, Pemberton’s situation grew increasingly dire. Grant’s superior numbers and strategic control over supply lines posed a significant challenge to the Confederate forces. Despite hopes of Johnston launching an attack from the east, the advice to surrender the town and save the troops prevailed. Grant’s decision to initiate a prolonged siege, following unsuccessful frontal assaults, marked the beginning of a grueling period of bombardment for Vicksburg.
Grant initially attempted to overpower the Confederate army by leveraging his larger numbers. Despite Grant’s efforts to assault the trenches on May 19 and May 22, these two frontal assaults aimed at capturing the city proved unsuccessful. The defensive line surrounding Vicksburg spanned approximately six and a half miles, taking advantage of the varying terrain that included hills and knobs with steep slopes. These natural features posed a challenge for attackers, who would have to ascend them while under enemy fire. The formidable perimeter of the defensive line consisted of numerous gun pits, forts, trenches, redoubts, and lunettes, which perfectly took advantage of the natural features.
The failure to take the Confederate works by assault led Grant to initiate a prolonged siege on May 25. As part of the siege, a significant bombardment was conducted. Union forces constructed their own network of earthworks and trenches that ran parallel to it. These trenches, referred to as ditches, marked the beginning of trench warfare. The situation within the besieged city worsened as the air became polluted by the stench of dead horses and soldiers, while the wounded often lay in the space between the opposing lines. Eventually, Grant agreed to a truce in order to clear the resulting mess. Recognizing that even with 50,000 soldiers, he would be unable to fully encircle Vicksburg due to unguarded roads leading south, Grant sought assistance from Major General Henry W. Halleck. Union troops in the West were subsequently shifted, and the front line was reinforced not only with heavy artillery from massive cannons but also with naval guns that targeted the city from the river.
Grant had expressed his dissatisfaction with McClernand’s lack of determination at Champion Hill, as he had failed to eliminate or capture Pemberton’s entire force. McClernand’s casualties were minimal on the Union’s southern flank, suggesting a lack of engagement, Sherman and others believed it was time for him to be removed from his position. Grant firmly believed that if the XIII Corps had launched a vigorous attack, Pemberton’s army could have been annihilated and the Siege of Vicksburg could have been avoided. However, Grant advised a different approach from his subordinates. Then, a newspaper article published an order in which McClernand praised his troops despite their unsuccessful assaults on Vicksburg. Grant saw this as an opportunity and seized it. While the order itself was acceptable, it undermined the efforts of others and contradicted both a departmental order and one issued by Grant, which stated that official papers should not be published. Consequently, Grant relieved McClernand of his duties on June 19th.
The Siege of Vicksburg
Daily bombardments began and were devastating. Union gunboats lobbed over 22,000 shells into the town and army artillery fire was even heavier. As the barrages continued, suitable housing in Vicksburg was reduced to a minimum. A ridge, located between the main town and the rebel defense line, provided lodging for the duration. The citizens of the city were unable to walk the streets or live in their houses. All above-ground homes and shelters were unsafe or destroyed.
Over time, Grant moved 77,000 Union soldiers into positions completely encircling Vicksburg, cutting off their supply line. Although surrounded and without access to food, weapons, and ammunition, Vicksburg’s Confederate soldiers and civilians continued their defense.
Confederate troops ate horses, dogs, and vegetables from the gardens of Vicksburg residents. Towards the end, some were eating rats and tree bark. As the siege wore on, fewer and fewer horses, mules, and dogs were seen wandering about Vicksburg. Shoe leather became a last resort of sustenance for many adults.
By the end of June, half of all of the Confederate soldiers were suffering from malnutrition including scurvy, caused by lack of Vitamin C. Others suffered from unsanitary conditions and developed dysentery, diarrhea, dehydration, and malaria. The lack of food, combined with the epidemics of malaria and dysentery, took a heavy toll on the Confederate forces. By the end of June, half were unable to report for duty and were sick or hospitalized. The poor diet was telling on the Confederate soldiers.
The townspeople were forced to build and live in caves. Many of their homes were destroyed by artillery bombardment, and those that remained were targets. Residents and soldiers dug over 500 caves into the hillside to escape the bombardment, hiding in their basements. During the 47-day siege, May 23-July 4, the Union Over 500 caves, known locally as “bombproofs”, were dug into the yellow clay hills of Vicksburg. Both soldiers and citizens were boxed in with plentiful munitions but little food.
During the 47-day siege, May 23-July 4, the Union experienced 638 casualties with 94 deaths, vs. the Confederate loss of 3202 casualties with 875 deaths. Additionally, there were 380 deaths at the Battle of Champion Hill on May 16. More than 10,000 of Pemberton’s soldiers were rendered unfit for duty as a consequence of various illnesses, combat wounds, and malnutrition by the end of June. There was essentially no functional army by early July.
The Confederate Army’s struggle with malaria was a significant contributing factor to the outcome of the Vicksburg campaign and hence the war. One of the reasons the Union siege of Vicksburg was successful was because the Confederates were debilitated by an outbreak of malaria, without access to quinine. It has been estimated that 3900-8850 of Pemberton’s 30,000 men were suffering from active cases of malaria, and minimally over 200 died directly from this disease. An illness of this severity experienced in this magnitude would have rendered the Confederate military combat ineffective.
On June 28, Pemberton received a petition from his troops which stated in part, “If you cannot feed us you had better surrender.” On July 1, he queried his division commanders whether they should surrender or attempt an evacuation. All 4 of his corps commanders wrote to him of the need to surrender. The Confederates, after a long siege, beset with malnutrition and disease, were not in a condition to fight. The consensus was that disease and starvation had physically impaired so large a number of the defending army that an attempt to cut through the Union line would be disastrous; the men were too “enfeebled” to attempt an evacuation. On July 4, 1863, after a 47-day siege, Pemberton surrendered to Grant.
General Ulysses S Grant: An Analysis
The fall of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863, just a day after Pickett’s Charge, certainly seems in combination to represent a catastrophic turn of events for the Confederacy that summer after victories that winter and spring seemed to hold so much promise.
General Grant has been demeaned as the worst POTUS in history, a drunkard, a dimwit, and most incorrectly, a butcher. While his reputation has improved lately thanks in large part to Ron Chernow’s biography and Donald Miller’s book about Vicksburg, he is routinely ranked behind Lee, Jackson, and Forrest as a Civil War general by many. Yet the truth is, General Grant did more to win the Civil War than anyone not named Abraham Lincoln. The story of how Grant solved the conundrum that was Vicksburg should convince even the most cynical LCer of his imagination, willpower, and perspicacity. Grant tried myriad strategies before finding the one that worked. The Vicksburg campaign was an unmistakable sign of the man’s steely determination and shrewd mind. Grant failed over and over, but he never gave up.
Practically everything about the campaign was innovative. Practically everything about it. James M. McPherson has called it “the most brilliant and innovative campaign of the Civil War” and T. Harry Williams called it “one of the classic campaigns of the Civil War and, indeed, of military history.” The U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 (May 1986) describes the Vicksburg campaign as “the most brilliant campaign ever fought on American soil,” one which “exemplifies the qualities of a well-conceived, violently executed offensive plan.” Edwin C. Bearss has said. “Failure in this venture would entail little less than total destruction. If it succeeded, however, the gains would be complete and decisive.”
It was definitely a risky plan. But we can see retrospectively that it makes perfect sense. Grant made the connection that the way to attack Vicksburg was by the train route west from Jackson, which was also the target of his Autumn foray on the Mississippi Central RR route. Then he combined that with the fact that he couldn’t maneuver on the east bank north of the town due to swamps and bayous, and after Arkansas Post, he’s on the west side. So, then it’s “just” a matter of technical procedure: you have to cross someplace and you have to head to Jackson first. When to do it? Well, he knows he’s got ground to cover and will need supplies. He has to calculate river level, rain and muddy roads, and foraging. But before mosquito season. Winter isn’t a good time. Late spring is.
Grant had endured repeated political and military setbacks, watched his soldiers and sailors sicken and die by the thousands in the malarial lower Mississippi Valley, faced two armies at the same time, and solved incredible technical and logistical obstacles. He was now the top Union general, and his self-confidence as well as what others thought would carry him to fame. It’s inconceivable to me that his reputation as a general was denigrated for 120 years.
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Further Reading:
· Donald L Miller, Vicksburg: Grant’s Campaign That Broke the Confederacy. Simon and Schuster, 2019.
· Grant’s Memoirs
· Sherman’s Memoirs
· Grant by Chernow
· https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/vicksburg
· https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-vicksburg
· https://civilwarmonths.com/2023/04/15/vicksburg-grant-and-porter-assemble/amp/
· https://www.historynet.com/vicksburg-the-campaign-that-confirmed-grants-greatness/
· https://www.historynet.com/americas-civil-war-colonel-benjamin-griersons-cavalry-raid-in-1863/
· https://www.historynet.com/griersons-raid-during-the-vicksburg-campaign/
· https://www.thoughtco.com/major-general-benjamin-grierson-2360423
· https://emergingcivilwar.com/2021/04/29/that-other-cavalry-guy-benjamin-h-grierson/
· https://www.historyonthenet.com/grant-vicksburg
· https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/port-gibson
· https://www.americanhistorycentral.com/entries/battle-of-port-gibson/
· https://www.nps.gov/vick/learn/historyculture/battleportgibson.htm
· https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/grants-vicksburg-supply-line
· https://www.historynet.com/mississippi-nightmare/
· https://www.thoughtco.com/battle-of-champion-hill-2360280
· Klein LW, Wittenberg EJ. The decisive influence of malaria on the outcome of the Vicksburg campaign. Surgeon’s Call: The Journal of the National Civil War Medicine Museum. 2023; 28(1): 4 – 14.