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Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza—and the assassinations, tanker wars, and drone attacks it has provoked throughout the broader Middle East—means the Gulf states are on edge. As the U.S. election approaches, the region’s two powerhouses—Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—might be expected to lean toward stability in the form of Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic nominee for president. But Harris’s policies may not bring the sort of stability that they desire.
Harris is likely to take a tougher stance on the conflicts in Sudan and Yemen and engage diplomatically with Iran, positions that are at odds with the two Gulf states’ geopolitical aspirations. Both countries, therefore, would likely prefer to see former President Donald Trump return to the White House. Trump’s transactional approach to diplomacy and disregard for political norms were vital to amplifying both Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s regional power.
This preference reflects a deeper strategic calculation. Under Trump’s previous administration, the Gulf states enjoyed unprecedented levels of U.S. support, including via arms deals and Washington’s hard-line stance against Iran. Harris’s expected approach to U.S. foreign policy presents a stark contrast. Although the Biden administration has maintained some tough positions on Iran, they are no match for the Trump era.
Harris would likely revive diplomatic engagements from the era of former President Barack Obama, shifting away from aggressive policies that have favored the Gulf states’ strategic objectives. The vice president argued in 2019, when she was a U.S. senator, that she would return to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal that Trump withdrew from, and that she would take whatever action was necessary to counteract Iran and its proxies and defend U.S. troops stationed in the region. Biden made a similar pledge during his 2020 presidential campaign, but the negotiations stalled for a variety of reasons.
Harris generally favors a more diplomatic and multilateral approach to regional dilemmas. Trump, by contrast, closely aligned himself with Gulf interests while in office, particularly on Iran and Yemen. In a potential second Trump presidency, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi see an opportunity to further bolster their regional ambitions.
Under Trump, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman began negotiating a megadeal with the United States. It would establish a security pact, civilian nuclear cooperation, and defense cooperation—including arms sales—between the two countries.
There was a catch, however: Saudi Arabia would have to normalize ties with Israel, contingent on significant progress toward Palestinian statehood. Those talks have been hampered by the ongoing war in Gaza.
While it has been referred to by commentators as a NATO-style agreement, the proposed pact is more similar to the defense treaty that the United States has with Japan. Unlike NATO’s Article 5, this deal stops short of guaranteeing an automatic U.S. military action in the event of an attack, allowing Washington some discretion in how much support it gives Saudi Arabia.
By all accounts, Harris is more likely to limit the scope of U.S. security commitments to Riyadh—and adhere to established regulations—than Trump. In 2019, during Trump’s administration, Saudi Arabia suffered an attack on two Aramco oil installations. In response, the United States deployed additional troops, missile defense systems, and radar equipment to Saudi Arabia. Mohammed bin Salman is convinced that Trump’s willingness to provide unconditional support for Saudi security interests makes a formalized deal with the United States more feasible, even if the two-state solution remains a sticking point.
The Saudi crown prince seeks a military edge over his regional neighbors. The defense component of the agreement aims to bolster U.S.-Saudi military ties through joint training, advisory programs, and increased arms sales. Riyadh is keen to secure advanced air defense systems to counter drone and missile threats from regional adversaries, particularly Iran and its so-called axis of resistance.
Trump has a track record of delivering: In 2017, his administration facilitated a major arms deal with Riyadh, potentially worth $110 billion. This move may have significantly bolstered Saudi military capabilities and regional dominance. (Some analysts have argued that this figure was exaggerated, noting that much of the package consisted of informal letters of intent or interest rather than contracts.)
In 2021, by contrast, Biden froze military sales to Saudi Arabia as part of a broader reassessment of U.S.-Saudi relations, citing concerns over the “humanitarian and strategic catastrophe” in Yemen. While military sales were restarted in 2024, with Washington citing escalating regional threats from Iran and Houthi forces, analysts have argued that Harris may impose greater scrutiny on arms sales to Riyadh, given her votes against Saudi arms sales while in the Senate.
Saudi Arabia also has nuclear ambitions—and the deal seeks to advance Riyadh’s goal of building a civilian nuclear program, akin to Iran’s. But the U.S. Senate and the international community have expressed concerns that the kingdom could eventually use that technology and infrastructure to develop nuclear weapons.
These fears are not unfounded: Mohammed bin Salman has explicitly argued that if Iran develops nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia would follow suit.
During the Trump presidency, however, members of the administration and U.S.-based nuclear firm Westinghouse are alleged to have held private negotiations with Saudi Arabia with minimal oversight, according to a report published in 2019 by Democrats in the House of Representatives. This signaled that Trump might be willing to assist Riyadh in developing nuclear infrastructure.
While Riyadh has always seen Tehran as its major regional threat, it was Mohammed bin Salman who advanced an explicitly aggressive and confrontational position against Iran. Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and new punitive measures significantly dented Iran’s economy; he positioned his administration as a key ally in curbing Iran’s regional influence.
Although Saudi Arabia and Iran have enjoyed official détente since 2023 thanks to a deal that China sponsored, Riyadh still perceives Tehran as the most significant threat to its security and regional ambitions. Harris’s signaling that she is willing to restart talks with Tehran and rejoin the nuclear deal may pose a strategic concern and dilemma for Riyadh—and could also reignite fears among Gulf countries of Iranian regional dominance.
The UAE’s preference for Trump is rooted in Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed’s diplomatic, security, and geopolitical considerations. Abu Dhabi’s strategic goals include gaining a military advantage over its neighbors—something that the Trump administration assisted the country with in the past.
In 2020, under Trump, the UAE became a signatory to the Abraham Accords, enhancing its diplomatic and economic clout. By 2022, bilateral trade with Israel had exceeded $2.5 billion, covering various sectors such as technology, agriculture, defense, and health care. Abu Dhabi’s relationship with Israel has proved useful in its quest to diversify its economy. Since its signing, the UAE has fostered collaborations with Israeli firms dealing in cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, financial technology, and renewable energy.
As part of Trump’s efforts to get the UAE to sign the Abraham Accords, he promised to sell the country F-35 fighter jets; Abu Dhabi expected that its military capabilities would experience a boost as a result. But Biden initially froze the sale due to regional security concerns and human rights issues. The freeze was lifted in April 2021 after a review.
Under Harris, this deal may face further delays or stricter conditions, particularly given the UAE’s involvement in conflicts in Yemen and Libya, and more recently, Sudan.
In Sudan, the UAE is supporting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, possibly in collaboration with Russia, in the militia’s war against the Sudanese government. With Trump expected to adopt a more lenient stance toward Moscow, this Emirati-Russia cooperation may continue to flourish.
Meanwhile, in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, the UAE has been developing military and port infrastructure, including the controversial Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal. This deal, which granted landlocked Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s coastline, has sparked outrage from the Somali government and escalated regional tensions. It has also contributed to the formation of an anti-Ethiopian “axis”; Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia recently formalized a security partnership aimed at countering Ethiopia’s growing influence.
Under Trump, Abu Dhabi pursued its ambitions with little interference, benefiting from the former U.S. president’s transactional foreign policy, which prioritized economic deals over political concerns. Biden, by contrast, has criticized the Saudi-led coalition, and in his first foreign-policy speech as president, he signaled that his administration would be “ending all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arms sales” in Yemen.
During a second Trump presidency, Abu Dhabi would have greater leeway to pursue its new goals.
Palestine remains the central political issue in the Arab and Muslim worlds, and managing this file—particularly the future of Gaza—could allow Abu Dhabi to overshadow Riyadh as a leading Islamic power, at least as long as a U.S.-brokered deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia remains elusive.
During the Gaza war, the UAE has supplied humanitarian aid to civilians and pushed for a cease-fire at the U.N. Security Council. Abu Dhabi has also advocated for a two-state solution while also balancing its Abraham Accords commitments with Israel, such as increasing trade and establishing a land corridor to bypass the Houthis’ attacks on ships in the Red Sea.
Although both Saudi Arabia and the UAE may prefer Trump over Harris, he could also heighten the rivalry between the two states. Trump’s transactional foreign policy tends to be superficial—and it often overlooks the underlying tensions between countries.
While Saudi Arabia and the UAE each stand to gain militarily and economically under Trump, their competition could intensify if one secures a closer relationship with Washington, potentially shifting the regional balance of power and complicating U.S. relations with both nations.