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This week’s BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, features a new participant: Turkey. A Kremlin official leaked last month that Ankara had applied to join the grouping, following repeated expressions of interest over the years. A spokesperson for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) then conceded that “a process is underway.”
The BRICS grouping undertook a major expansion recently, adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates in January, with Saudia Arabia still mulling whether to join. The acronym stands for the group’s original members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
This week’s BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, features a new participant: Turkey. A Kremlin official leaked last month that Ankara had applied to join the grouping, following repeated expressions of interest over the years. A spokesperson for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) then conceded that “a process is underway.”
The BRICS grouping undertook a major expansion recently, adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates in January, with Saudia Arabia still mulling whether to join. The acronym stands for the group’s original members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
Still, Turkey’s BRICS application is a watershed moment in geopolitics. If Turkey joins BRICS as a full member or partner state, it would become the first NATO member and longtime candidate for European Union membership to have an active role in an entity seen by some analysts as a challenger to Western predominance.
Turkey’s diplomatic demarche is yet another sign that the global south is rising in world affairs, and it underscores the growth of active nonalignment as an ideology. But it is not a major break in Turkish foreign policy: Ankara’s BRICS application is an extension of its international balancing act, which aims to diversify alliances while maintaining ties with the West.
During two decades in office, Erdogan has promoted a non-Western-centric vision of the world and sought greater global autonomy due to frustration with the EU and the United States. For its part, BRICS is on a roll in terms of both membership and growing global clout. In addition to Turkey, countries such as Malaysia and Thailand have also applied for entry and sent envoys to this year’s summit.
Cooperation among BRICS members in energy, trade, and infrastructure development is growing at a fast clip. As a share of global trade, intra-BRICS trade in goods more than doubled from 2002 to 2022, reaching 40 percent. In 2015, the group created the Shanghai-based New Development Bank with $50 billion in capital. The bank, headed by former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, has since lent $33 billion for 96 projects.
BRICS now aims to create an alternative payment system to SWIFT, which it perceives as a Western-dominated international banking system. The project has taken on greater importance after Western countries disconnected Russia from SWIFT following the country’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
BRICS would benefit from Turkey’s accession. From a geopolitical standpoint, Turkey’s membership would enhance the group’s stature as a proponent of nonalignment, as opposed to a bloc with an anti-Western agenda—though it would certainly increase Western suspicions about Turkey. At present, the group is torn. China and Russia would like to build it into an anti-Western entity, while Brazil, India, and South Africa would prefer it to take a stance closer to nonalignment. Turkey’s presence is likely to strengthen the second view. The same goes for most of the new members, except for Iran, which is likely to hew close to China and Russia.
Joining BRICS would also put Turkey, a NATO member, in a privileged position: Having a foot in both camps increases Ankara’s foreign-policy leverage. “Being involved in these structures does not mean abandoning NATO,” Erdogan told journalists at the United Nations General Assembly in September. “We do not think that this alliance and cooperation are an alternative to one another.”
Despite Erdogan’s high profile in global affairs, Turkey’s domestic agenda has become increasingly challenging for the president. In March, the AKP lost ground in municipal elections, while economic growth has slowed and inflation runs rampant. But domestic constraints have not limited Turkey’s quest for influence across Eurasia; if anything, these international endeavors offer a welcome distraction.
Erdogan’s foreign policy is built on a complex blend of Turkey’s Ottoman legacy, nationalist aspirations, and a sense that the West’s best days are behind it. He seeks a more multipolar world, where Turkey can act independently of Western hegemony and search for strategic options beyond the West, even if this means partnering with historical enemies, such as Russia, or with countries that have pursued draconian policies against Muslim minorities, such as China.
Erdogan has sought to expand Turkey’s strategic wiggle room through diplomacy. He has signed energy deals with Russia, allowing the Russian state-owned utility Rosatom to build, own, and operate Turkey’s first nuclear power plant; mediated in armed conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war; and rallied support against Israel’s military actions in Gaza.
Turkey’s BRICS application is no different. It is not about breaking ties with the West but rather recalibrating them in favor of broader and more diversified alliances that are important to Turkey’s long-term national interests—particularly as Ankara’s prospects for EU membership grow dim and strategic ties with the United States weaken.
Turkey’s decades-long bid for EU membership has been marked by frustration. As Ankara has pushed for accession, EU responses have been lukewarm at best, especially after French and German opposition in the late 2000s. With a population of 87 million people, Turkey would be the largest country in the EU and the only Muslim-majority member. Democratic backsliding after the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the 2016 coup attempt have not helped its case. Today, while Turkey remains a candidate officially, its EU accession talks have stalled.
EU ambivalence over Turkish membership stems from concerns over Turkey’s human rights record and growing authoritarianism under Erdogan’s leadership. There are also disputes over Cyprus and maritime rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. The 2023 European Commission report on Turkey further strained relations; the report condemned Ankara’s democratic erosion and suggested that it is nowhere close to reaching full membership.
Turkey’s links with the United States have not fared any better. A major point of contention was Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system, which led to its removal from the F-35 fighter jet program. In response, Turkey opted for F-16s, taking advantage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine to upgrade its defense industry. The conflict also increased Turkey’s leverage over NATO, particularly as it stonewalled Sweden’s bid for membership.
Amid the war in Gaza, Erdogan’s alignment with the Palestinian cause and vocal criticism of Western support for Israel have deepened rifts between Ankara and Washington. In the past, the Turkish president also blamed the Obama administration for its support for the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces during the Syrian civil war, an issue that has lingered.
All the same, Turkey has proved that it is still indispensable to the West: It has acted as a key mediator in the Russia-Ukraine war, underscoring its delicate balancing act between NATO commitments and partnership with Moscow. In this role, Turkey has achieved impressive results—such as facilitating the largest prisoner swap since the Cold War.
For Erdogan, these developments have confirmed Turkey’s need to pursue a form of nonalignment and to shift its focus toward the global south and non-Western entities. Turkey’s pivot has led it to engagements across the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, where Ankara has expanded its networks and business. In this context, BRICS offers Turkey a unique opportunity to join a rising bloc that represents a significant portion of the global south as well as Russia and China—key actors in Eurasia.
In a world marked by great-power rivalry and competing grand narratives, Turkey stands to regain its role as a bridge between the West, global south, and Eurasian powers. The country’s unique position draws on its geographical location and imperial history. By applying to join the BRICS—an informal yet high-profile group—Turkey is signaling to the West that it should not be taken for granted.