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As Moldovans prepare to go to the polls on Oct. 20, it looks like another round of the familiar geopolitical standoff between Russia and the West over the countries in Moscow’s former empire and sphere of influence. In a crucial referendum, Moldovans will vote on whether to pursue membership in the European Union. They must also choose between Maia Sandu, the pro-EU incumbent president with a reformist agenda, and a cohort of pro-Russian candidates of varying degrees of radicalism.
Russia is deploying its usual catalog of influence operations as it tries to undermine the small country’s path toward Western institutions. The evidence of Russian meddling is abundant, and the sums Moscow is funneling to its proxies are unprecedented in Moldovan politics. Besides paying tens of thousands of Moldovans to vote against joining the EU and financing pro-Moscow candidates, Russia has also doubled down on its usual tactic of using shady oligarchs to try to capture the state. Finally, there is Transnistria—a Russian-occupied sliver of Moldova next to Ukraine. It is a typical frozen conflict, and it is another tried-and-true strategy for Moscow to assert pressure on countries it wants to control. Although the threat of a Russian invasion of Moldova from Transnistria is currently extremely low because Russia is busy fighting Ukraine, that could always change in the future.
As Moldovans prepare to go to the polls on Oct. 20, it looks like another round of the familiar geopolitical standoff between Russia and the West over the countries in Moscow’s former empire and sphere of influence. In a crucial referendum, Moldovans will vote on whether to pursue membership in the European Union. They must also choose between Maia Sandu, the pro-EU incumbent president with a reformist agenda, and a cohort of pro-Russian candidates of varying degrees of radicalism.
Russia is deploying its usual catalog of influence operations as it tries to undermine the small country’s path toward Western institutions. The evidence of Russian meddling is abundant, and the sums Moscow is funneling to its proxies are unprecedented in Moldovan politics. Besides paying tens of thousands of Moldovans to vote against joining the EU and financing pro-Moscow candidates, Russia has also doubled down on its usual tactic of using shady oligarchs to try to capture the state. Finally, there is Transnistria—a Russian-occupied sliver of Moldova next to Ukraine. It is a typical frozen conflict, and it is another tried-and-true strategy for Moscow to assert pressure on countries it wants to control. Although the threat of a Russian invasion of Moldova from Transnistria is currently extremely low because Russia is busy fighting Ukraine, that could always change in the future.
But the jostling of pro-Russian political forces in Moldova ahead of the election is hardly a sign of Moscow’s strength and sophistication. Instead, the Kremlin seems to have failed to adapt its election interference strategies to the new realities of Moldovan politics—particularly, the decline in support for Russia since its invasion of neighboring Ukraine. Today, even some of the pro-Russian politicians support EU membership and try to avoid being too closely associated with Moscow.
Long after Moldova gained its independence during the Soviet Union’s breakup in 1991, the Kremlin remained a potent force in its former possession’s politics. It awards its minions with generous financing and receptions in Moscow while punishing unfavorable Moldovan governments with trade bans and gas price hikes. Today, Russia still looms large in Moldovan public opinion, even though Moldova has severed most official ties between the two countries since the start of the invasion. According to a 2024 poll by the International Republican Institute (IRI), 71 percent of Moldovans surveyed said relations with Russia are currently very bad or somewhat bad, compared to only 11 percent who said that about the EU. But only 46 percent of Moldovans see Russia as a moderate or great threat to their country, while 53 percent rank it among the country’s most important economic partners—behind only the EU at 66 percent and neighboring Romania at 69 percent. Similarly, half of the people polled saw Russia as one of the country’s most important political partners, as well.
It is doubtful, however, whether Moscow can take advantage of this lingering popularity to turn around this weekend’s vote, which is expected to come out in favor of Sandu and EU membership. Moldova’s left-leaning parties, which have historically been pro-Russian, still command around 40 percent support. But they have struggled to adjust their narratives to Russia’s brutal war next door.
Since the invasion started, many on the Moldovan left have worked to cast off their image as Russian stooges. Some, like the popular mayor of Chisinau, Ion Ceban, and former Prime Minister Ion Chicu, have tried to reinvent themselves as centrist pro-Europeans. They have abandoned their former party, the powerful Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), which is much tainted by past cooperation with the Kremlin, and founded their own political movements. Their new pro-EU views have elicited much skepticism, but they have already captured around 10 percent support, principally among Moldovans who are both unhappy with Sandu and disenchanted with Moscow.
The rest of the PSRM has proved less agile. The party’s leader, former Moldovan President Igor Dodon, is notorious for his close ties to Moscow. But with the presidential election looming, the party tried to adapt to Russia’s waning sway by sidelining Dodon and nominating former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo as a candidate. Stoianoglu, while also stressing the need for cooperation with Moscow, has a record of supporting EU integration and is widely perceived as a moderate figure. It is difficult to determine the real state of his relations with the Kremlin, but his cautious rhetoric and low-budget campaign suggest that Russia is not fully behind him.
Russian money appears to be channeled elsewhere this time. Moldovan police recently stated that during September alone, more than $15 million was transferred from Russia to bank accounts connected to the fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor.
Shor, who was sentenced to prison in absentia for his role in a scam involving almost $1 billion extracted from Moldovan banks, embodies another typical Kremlin strategy: influence a country through Russia-friendly oligarchs. This has long been an important part of Russia’s strategy for gaining control of Ukraine, Georgia, and other countries.
But betting on Shor, who holds Russian citizenship and resides in Moscow, suggests that the Kremlin has reached the limits of its oligarch strategy. Indeed, it would be hard to find a more inept figure to have entrusted with winning over Moldovan voters. Shor is widely seen as a corrupt crook; at 58 percent, he has the highest unfavorable rating among a long roster of politicians in the IRI poll. He is so unpopular that researchers noted that his activities actually boost support for Sandu. His talking points—lambasting the EU and touting the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union—seem more attuned to appeal to his friends in the Kremlin than to most Moldovan voters.
For Moscow, Shor is a reliable proxy because he is well-versed in the shady side of Moldovan politics, structures his campaign in a way that corresponds to the Kremlin’s world outlook, and is such a toxic figure that he couldn’t betray Russia even if he wanted to. This latter quality—absolute loyalty—has become Moscow’s key and almost only criterion for choosing allies.
The few elections Shor’s movement has won—such as regional votes in Gagauzia and Orhei—came with accusations of massive vote-buying. If current reports of vote-buying are true, it’s unclear how effective that tactic will be. Most of the 130,000 Moldovans that have reportedly been bribed by Shor’s associates to vote against EU membership were, in all likelihood, already favorably inclined toward Moscow. In the presidential election, neither Shor’s candidate Vasile Bolea nor Shor’s Victory bloc were permitted to register due to financial irregularities.
Shor may still throw his support behind one of the opposition candidates by this weekend’s vote, but that is unlikely to make much of a difference. The election promises to deal a major blow to Russia’s lingering influence in Moldova. Recent polls suggest that the referendum will confirm majority support for EU integration, while the presidential election will see Sandu reelected by a wide margin, with the moderate left opposition prevailing over pro-Russian radicals.
In freeing itself from Russian influence, Moldova still faces the hurdle of next year’s parliamentary elections, where a clear and overwhelming victory by Sandu and her allies is not guaranteed. But Russia’s war has brought Moldovan politics closer to the point where all major forces agree that integration with the West is good for the country, an evolution many other post-communist states have already undergone.
This reality dooms pro-Russian string-pullers like Shor to languish on the fringes of political life, even if Moldova one day permits him to return without serving his prison sentence. But the ossified leadership in the Kremlin doesn’t seem to care. Moscow prefers loyal minions and familiar methods, even if they end up driving Moldovans even farther away from Russia.