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The United States is once again preparing to leave Iraq.
Reports indicate that Baghdad and Washington have agreed to wind down Operation Inherent Resolve. The remaining 2,500 American troops in Iraq will withdraw in two phases over the next two years, marking the end of the decade-long counter-Islamic State mission. Under this agreement, a contingent of U.S. forces will remain in the semiautonomous Kurdistan region to support operations in Syria.
Since engaging in the first Gulf War, the United States has never really left Iraq. Desert Storm gave way to military and humanitarian operations that established no-fly zones, monitored Iraqi forces, and enforced sanctions. These activities continued until the 2003 invasion. When Operation Iraqi Freedom ended in 2011, a small advisory presence remained to train and assist Iraqi forces. In 2014, the United States returned in force to prosecute counter-Islamic State operations. That combat mission ended in December 2021, leaving the residual 2,500 service members.
Now, for the fourth time in as many decades, the United States is preparing to leave Iraq, in keeping with the concluding mission’s changing scope and objectives. As usual, the Pentagon is already hedging. “The U.S. is not withdrawing from Iraq,” Sabrina Singh, the Pentagon’s deputy press secretary, recently told reporters. “Our footprint is going to be changing within the country.”
The Pentagon wants to maintain a semipermanent “advise and assist” mission, and this desire stems from strategic, intelligence, and logistical needs for managing regional threats. While these are reasonable concerns, the human and financial costs of a continued military presence outweigh the benefits. A shift toward diplomatic efforts, intelligence sharing, and the empowerment of local forces would reduce American vulnerabilities while cementing a more durable relationship.
The United States can withdraw from Iraq because the counter-Islamic State mission is largely complete. Regional partners can deal with the remnants. Meanwhile, a sustained military presence aggravates Iraqi nationalists and provides adversaries with a convenient target. As the war between Israel and the Axis of Resistance spreads, the threat to U.S. troops grows. These forces are left as bait in a trap we have set ourselves. Policymakers should quit stalling and, in so doing, reorient American foreign policy.
For the American public, the images and events that emerged from Iraq have had an undeniable impact on our culture, politics, and collective memory.
The first Gulf War captivated an American audience. Twenty-four-hour CNN news covered precision-guided bombs hitting targets in the air war over Baghdad while Patriot missiles foiled Scud strikes in Saudi Arabia and Israel. This media barrage changed the way Americans ingested their news. It also beamed American unipolarity into every living room, showcasing the U.S. military’s unrivaled technological superiority amid the simultaneous collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union. “By God,” President George H.W. Bush remarked in 1991, “we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.”
Having metabolized the success of this formative expedition—and emerged from the tragedy of 9/11 in search of retributive justice—the United States waded into Iraq again in 2003. Americans can recall when “shock and awe” commenced on March 19, with ground forces entering Iraq from Kuwait the following day. By April 9, U.S. forces had captured Baghdad. That same day, a chain was wrapped around the statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square before it was wrested from its plinth. “Major combat operations” finished on April 15. Two weeks later, President George W. Bush boarded the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln to declare victory, framed by the infamous “Mission Accomplished” banner. All this, a mere three months into an eight-year conflict that resulted in the deaths of more than 4,000 U.S. service members and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.
By 2010, the political scientist Gary Jacobson was able to credibly assert that the Iraq War had “divided the American public along party lines far more than any other U.S. military action since the advent of scientific polling back in the 1930s.” When U.S. troops left Iraq in December 2011, a symbolic ceremony officially “cased” the U.S. forces flag, formally ending military operations without fanfare.
The rise of the Islamic State prompted a return to Iraq in 2014. Operation Inherent Resolve, as it was designated, initially focused on U.S. and coalition airstrikes and providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to Iraqi and Kurdish forces battling the newly formed caliphate. Ground operations soon followed. The reconquest of territory required a “by, with, and through” approach that relied on local allies to fight on the ground but, in some cases, required U.S. forces to engage in direct combat alongside regional partners. Three years later, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared victory over the Islamic State in Iraq and proclaimed the liberation of all territory previously held by militants.
Of course, the U.S. military presence in Iraq did not end with the territorial defeat of the Islamic State. But unlike previous deployments, this enduring mission is now largely ignored by the American public. This obliviousness is understandable. Media coverage and political debate rarely spotlight the U.S. presence in Iraq. However, this static mission is microcosmic of our new way of making war. Buried deep within the news cycle, these operations comprise an elite project led by committed Pentagon brass and sharp executive branch lawyers. This is war by writ of arcane legal authorizations without public buy-in. It has had an erosive effect on our constitutional republic, and it should end.
Congress passed the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) to empower Bush to invade Iraq and remove Saddam. This AUMF is outdated. It is also legally and operationally redundant and should be repealed.
All key enemies targeted by the 2002 AUMF, including Saddam Hussein, are dead. Nearly all current military operations in the Middle East rely on a generous reading of the 2001 AUMF—brokered days after Sept. 11, 2001, to prosecute war “against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States”—and the president’s Article II powers. The Biden administration endorsed repeal of the 2002 AUMF in a Statement of Administration Policy, and various repeal efforts have secured majority support in both chambers of Congress, albeit incongruously.
A congressional revocation of all outdated authorizations would signal a shift toward reclamation of constitutional war powers. Despite bipartisan calls to end “forever wars,” Congress has long deferred to the executive branch, allowing the AUMFs to remain in place. This deference has allowed successive administrations to justify actions incommensurate with original intent.
Repealing these authorizations would mark a significant step toward the reassertion of congressional authority over the conduct of war. (The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was repealed in 1971, meaning it has been more than 50 years since the Congress repealed a war authorization.)
It also presents an opportunity for lawmakers to address outdated policies and ensure future military operations are subject to appropriate oversight. Finally, a successful repeal effort would force Congress to wrestle with the U.S. record in Iraq and close the book on this complex chapter in American history.
Before doing so, there are a number of lessons to be learned from the disorganized withdrawal from Afghanistan. Unlike in Afghanistan, Iraq claims a more stable political infrastructure and a variety of capable security forces that can effectively prosecute counter-terrorism efforts. The complicating factor here is not the immediate resurgence of the Islamic State but the threat posed to U.S. troops by paramilitary Popular Mobilization Forces. Some of these outfits are Iranian clients, operating simultaneously on Baghdad’s payroll but outside the administration of the Defense Ministry. These militias have frequently exchanged fire with the U.S. military, threatening a broader conflict while exacerbating tensions between Washington and the Iraqi government. Somewhat absurdly, the withdrawal of American servicemembers would demand reorientation on the part of these irregulars, focusing their attention on mopping up whatever is left of the Islamic State.
Nonetheless, effective withdrawal will require a well-coordinated logistical operation. The United States has long maintained a complex military presence in Iraq, from sprawling airbases like the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) and Al Asad Air Base to smaller outposts and garrisons. Originally established to fight the post-Saddam insurgency in Iraq, these bases have evolved into symbols of America’s enduring presence.
BIAP and Al Asad—sprawling complexes equipped to support thousands of U.S. personnel—are central to operations extending across the Middle East. These bases are more than runways for fighter jets and drones; they serve as critical nodes for intelligence operations, logistical coordination, and rapid deployment of forces. However, the strategic value of these installations comes at a cost. On the ground, the activities at these bases and their derivative outposts mix direct combat with the nuanced work of training and supporting local forces. This dual role places American troops in an increasingly complex battlefield where they serve both as a shield to protect local allies and as a sponge to absorb attacks. Over the past year, dozens of service members have been wounded in Iraq, and several contractors killed.
At bases like BIAP, early phases of drawdown will focus on the systematic categorization and securing of sensitive equipment. Armored vehicles, convoys, and mixed-use fleets of vehicles will transport high-value tech to nearby airstrips, where airlifts are positioned for quick deployment. In addition to conventional heavy-lift capabilities, special operations deploy a variety of specialized short take-off and landing aircraft tailored to the demands of covert and rapid-extraction missions.
Smaller outposts and team houses, often positioned near conflict zones for tactical reasons, can be deactivated quickly. Essential equipment will be either extracted via secure convoys or airlifted by helicopters adept at fast, low-visibility operations. Nonessential items such as basic training materials and nonsensitive electronics may be left behind to aid local forces—a practical approach to resource management.
The premature closure of critical infrastructure like Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan highlights the importance of retaining control of strategic hubs until personnel and sensitive materials are safely removed. A phased approach would prioritize evacuating high-threat areas to protect personnel from insurgent attacks. Remaining forces would consolidate at key strategic hubs to manage logistics and maintain defenses until the final exit. Maintaining control of airbases ensures adequate logistical infrastructure for military extraction and relocation of critical assets, preventing valuable technology or intelligence from falling into hostile hands. Such a structured withdrawal plan also demonstrates a commitment to leaving behind a stable environment.
Yet the removal of personnel and equipment from Iraq may be the easy part. The more difficult task may be summoning the political determination on the part of our elected officials to prioritize strategic interests over tactical imperatives. And both withdrawal from Iraq and the repeal of the AUMF necessitate an emotional detachment from a country that has commanded U.S. attention since the end of the Cold War.
To leave Iraq, U.S. policymakers should reflect on the fact that before August 1990, Iraq hardly registered in the American consciousness. A mental reset should reflect that fact that Iraq often became a problem of our own making. The default position for other countries should be that they do not require permanent U.S. bases.
This sort of reckoning should prompt consideration of not just the “how” but the “why” of our military engagements to ensure they serve the broader goals of peace, stability, and national security. It is time to shift from indefinite deployments to a strategy that preserves the lives of our troops and our long-term national security interests. Such a break will provide space to realign our foreign policy priorities, refocus on building sustainable local solutions to regional instability, and perhaps contend with the untidy legacy we have left.
We can begin this remedial process by leaving Iraq behind.