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Iran’s second strike on Israeli soil with a barrage of missiles on October 1 marked a significant escalation in the ongoing conflict between the two regional powers. After Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July and the more recent killings of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Gen. Abbas Nilforoushan of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Beirut, Iran launched an overt, substantial, and direct attack against its sworn enemy. The Iran-Israel conflict now risks pushing the entire Middle East to the brink of a full regional war.
Regardless of whether that war takes place, the exchange of attacks by Iran and Israel has already led to a new regional power equation that will last far beyond this specific confrontation. Seven far-reaching strategic consequences of the Iran-Israel conflict have become discernible.
Iran’s second strike on Israeli soil with a barrage of missiles on October 1 marked a significant escalation in the ongoing conflict between the two regional powers. After Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July and the more recent killings of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Gen. Abbas Nilforoushan of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Beirut, Iran launched an overt, substantial, and direct attack against its sworn enemy. The Iran-Israel conflict now risks pushing the entire Middle East to the brink of a full regional war.
Regardless of whether that war takes place, the exchange of attacks by Iran and Israel has already led to a new regional power equation that will last far beyond this specific confrontation. Seven far-reaching strategic consequences of the Iran-Israel conflict have become discernible.
First, the foundation of Iran’s national security and military strategy is gradually shifting from a reliance on nonstate military allies in the region toward a new form of deterrence. This profound transformation can be observed in the replacement of key figures in Iran’s military organization: from Gen. Qassem Soleimani, a former commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force who was responsible for Iran’s extraterritorial military operation in the region, to Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the IRGC’s aerospace forces. This suggests that Iran’s gray-zone strategy, which prioritized indirect conflict by nonstate allies including Hamas and Hezbollah, is now becoming a complementary approach.
Second, Iran has also abandoned its posture of “strategic patience.” Since the end of the bloody eight-year war with Iraq, Iranian military leaders adopted a covert strategy based on absorbing substantial pain while retaliating at a time of their choosing. Nonetheless, decades of continuous Israeli sabotage on Iranian soil downgraded Iran’s “strategic ambiguity” to what became known as passive strategic patience, marked by a lack of retaliatory action. Despite its apparent reluctance to make bold decisions in domestic politics, Iran has now abandoned its strategic patience for the second time. It has concluded, after intense pressure by influential supporters and the broader public opinion within the country, that a failure to retaliate would mark a strategic inflection point.
Third, Iran has now established a publicly discernable policy on deterrence. The IRGC’s forceful retaliation showcased Iran’s will and ability to carry out a damaging attack on Israel. In contrast to the first strike in April, where most Iranian missiles and drones were interdicted, the second missile strike proved more successful, penetrating Israeli advanced defense systems. Despite Israel having one of the most heavily defended airspaces in the world, equipped with the most sophisticated anti-missile technology, several Iranian missiles managed to hit key airfields in Israel. This highlights the centrality of missile power in Iran’s national security strategy, reinforcing that its missile capabilities will likely remain nonnegotiable in future talks with the West. Tehran may now be further motivated to enhance its military capabilities, which could involve deploying Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets, purchasing Russian-made anti-missile defense systems, and expanding military cooperation with Moscow.
Fourth, Iran’s new red line toward Israel has also been defined. For nearly 15 years, Tel Aviv has conducted destructive strikes on Iranian military bases in Syria, even directly targeting Iranian senior generals. However, Israel’s bombardment of Iran’s consulate in Damascus in early April crossed a critical threshold, prompting Iran to hit Israel back with a barrage of less advanced missiles and drones two weeks later. This marked a collapse of Iran’s traditional red lines with Israel. In response to continued Israeli actions, including the assassination of a Hamas leader in Tehran and of Hezbollah in Beirut, Iran’s retaliation was aimed at reestablishing a level of deterrence. For the next time, Iran crossed two significant red lines: striking Israeli territory from its own soil and targeting a nuclear-armed state. Interestingly, Iran hit the territory of another nuclear power, Pakistan, less than 10 months earlier. Tehran’s message was clear: The sanctity of its own territory is a fundamental red line for both the government and society, even if it cannot fully protect its military bases in the Levant from Israeli airstrikes. With no firmly established red line to contain the Iranian-Israeli rivalry, both sides will likely seek to redraw the boundaries through the continuation of tit-for-tat strikes, particularly in the lead-up to the U.S. presidential election this year.
Fifth, Iran’s influence in the Arab street has apparently increased. The soft power gains from this recent attack might potentially restore Iran’s popularity in the Muslim world, which was tarnished by Tehran’s unwavering support for Syria’s Assad regime. Since the war with Hamas in Gaza, Iran’s support among Palestinians and Arab communities has notably risen. The victory of Masoud Pezeshkian in the recent Iranian presidential election, coupled with a strong voice of regional cooperation led by Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, may help reduce tension between Tehran and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, Iran still lacks a strong regional initiative and may face challenges in fully capitalizing on this opportunity and translating this influence into tangible shifts in the regional power arrangement.
Sixth, Israel’s retaliatory operation against Iran could drastically transform Tehran’s nuclear policy. There are strong voices in Iran, predominantly in the hardliner camp, advocating for the pursuit of nuclear power as a strategic means to restore the country’s full deterrence. These proponents argue that Iran’s most effective tool for deterring Israeli aggression lies in its strategic decision to fully develop nuclear weapons. The reasoning behind this argument could gain substantial momentum following any potential Israeli retaliatory assault on Iranian nuclear infrastructure. As a result, the prospect of any Israeli military strike may serve to further accelerate Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear power. The West’s obsession with Iran’s complete disarmament, combined with granting Israel a blank check to pressure Iran’s nonstate allies in the Levant and even Iranian territory might have an unintentional consequence: a nuclear-armed Iran.
Seventh, this conflict highlights a clash between technological power and geopolitical power. While Iran benefits from significant geopolitical advantages, Israel’s Achilles heel lies in its geopolitical vulnerability, confined to a small territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. This geopolitical difference has shaped their strategies as Iran has favored its gray-zone operations supported by its network of nonstate allies, while Israel relies on its first-shock, preemptive strike strategy rooted in technological superiority. Although technology plays an increasingly important role in military revolutions, geopolitical factors continue to be essential in shaping the trajectory of regional competitions. Technology erodes the weight of enduring geopolitical realities, but it can never fully erase them.
In that sense, the escalated Iran-Israel conflict also challenges simplistic narratives about the “end of the Middle East” in U.S. foreign policy. In a broader context, the destiny of Washington’s grand competitions in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions is increasingly pitched down the Persian Gulf-Levant axis where Tehran has been strengthening its ties with Moscow and Beijing. This dynamic is recentering geopolitics in the Middle East. The Iran-Israel conflict is one of its early manifestations, but it is also far from the final chapter.