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U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has famously promised to end Russia’s war in Ukraine on his first day in office, but he has been characteristically vague on how he will do it. Stopping the war is, of course, anything but straightforward. Even if he manages to reach a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which is by no means a given, a deal without Ukraine and Europe on board may not mean much. It may not even mean the end of the war.
The real risk is not the prospect of a Trump-Putin deal struck above the heads of Ukrainians and Europeans. It is, rather, that Putin will use Trump’s desire for a deal to extract concessions from the United States, split the West, and undermine Western support for Ukraine. This would make it easier for Russia to subjugate and take political control of Ukraine; rearm and recover with the strength of the Ukrainian economy and population; and prepare for the next attack on a European country. What’s left of Western alliances and the European security order would be permanently destroyed.
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has famously promised to end Russia’s war in Ukraine on his first day in office, but he has been characteristically vague on how he will do it. Stopping the war is, of course, anything but straightforward. Even if he manages to reach a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which is by no means a given, a deal without Ukraine and Europe on board may not mean much. It may not even mean the end of the war.
The real risk is not the prospect of a Trump-Putin deal struck above the heads of Ukrainians and Europeans. It is, rather, that Putin will use Trump’s desire for a deal to extract concessions from the United States, split the West, and undermine Western support for Ukraine. This would make it easier for Russia to subjugate and take political control of Ukraine; rearm and recover with the strength of the Ukrainian economy and population; and prepare for the next attack on a European country. What’s left of Western alliances and the European security order would be permanently destroyed.
The core of a Trump-Putin deal could include dropping U.S. support for Ukraine’s NATO membership, committing to Ukraine’s neutrality, recognizing Russia’s annexations in Ukraine, ending sanctions, and limiting (or ending) military and other assistance to Ukraine. In exchange, Russia could commit to a cease-fire and to stopping missile and drone attacks on Ukraine. A demilitarized zone along the current line would separate the forces.
It is far from obvious that Putin would accept such a deal given his far-reaching, stated objectives to subjugate Ukraine. But Russia might accept for tactical reasons—to consolidate its territorial gains, as well as rearm and reconstitute its forces so that it can attack Ukraine again in a few years. Russia is already rearming, with defense spending expected to reach 32 percent of next year’s state budget. The financial strains caused by sanctions could also prompt Moscow to go for a deal. Moreover, agreeing directly with Washington on matters of European security is exactly how Putin wants the world to work.
It is entirely possible that Putin and Trump will fail to reach a deal. Putin has a habit of overplaying his hand in negotiations by making outlandish demands, often ending up with no deal at all. Even if Trump cares little about the substance of a settlement, accepting all of Putin’s demands would make Trump look weak and set Ukraine up for an embarrassing failure during his administration.
Moreover, Putin believes that Russia is winning. The Kremlin sees that the war is costly and incrementally slow, but it is progressing. Ukraine is becoming weaker, and Western resolve to support it is declining. Why agree to a deal now when more can be gained on the battlefield? And the more territory Russia takes, the stronger its position will be and the better a deal it could get in the future.
A cease-fire might also be seen by Russia as giving Ukraine a tactical pause. There is a view in Moscow that the 2014 Minsk agreements were mistakes, since they gave Ukraine precious time to modernize its armed forces with assistance from NATO members. Russia may not want to risk another such scenario.
If Putin rejects a deal, Trump—always afraid of appearing weak—may try to put additional pressure on Putin to change his mind. Trump would have an interest in preventing an all-out victory for Russia in Ukraine, which could be seen as Trump’s Afghanistan. There are still significant parts of the Republican Party, especially on Capitol Hill and including some aides close to Trump, that support Ukraine and are hawkish on Russia. Moreover, some of the China hawks in his administration might argue that a Russian victory in Ukraine would make a Chinese attack on Taiwan more likely—something Trump may want to avoid.
The Trump administration could put pressure on Russia by working with Saudi Arabia to flood global oil markets and undercut Russia’s export income. Trump’s pick for national security advisor, Mike Waltz, has proposed this option to paralyze Russia’s economy. Significantly harder sanctions could also be imposed. It’s also possible to imagine a scenario where Trump steps up military assistance to Ukraine and further lifts restrictions on the use of Western weapons to hit Russia. By altering the balance of power on the battlefield, Trump would try to create the conditions for a deal.
The problem for Trump is that a deal with Putin over the heads of Ukraine and Europe is not much of a deal. Even if Washington drops its support for Kyiv’s future NATO membership and supports neutrality instead, Ukraine and Europe may not necessarily accept it. An official change to NATO’s open-door policy, where no country is permanently barred from membership, would require consensus among members.
Also, if the United States recognizes the occupied territories as formally belonging to Russia but Ukraine and European countries do not, this issue would enter a legal twilight zone. A deal wouldn’t even necessarily end the war if the Ukrainians continue fighting with weapons and ammunition that they are increasingly producing themselves and with what they receive from European partners.
Most Ukrainians see this war as existential and have no illusions about a cease-fire that would give Russia a chance to regroup to attack Ukraine again. Formally ceding territory to Russia is also a political nonstarter in Ukraine, especially without robust security guarantees, notably NATO membership. Neutrality has proven to be a dangerous prospect in the face of Russian revanchism; it helps to recall that Ukraine was declaredly neutral with no prospect of NATO membership when Russia first invaded in 2014. This is exactly why Ukrainians want to be inside NATO and the European Union.
Europe—with a few exceptions, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban—would balk at recognizing Russia’s territorial conquests. This would upend the European security order and set a precedent of legitimizing conquest. Many allies, especially Europe’s eastern front-line countries, would also object to forcing neutral status on Ukraine.
Trump would invariably try to strong-arm Ukraine and Europe to accept any deal. He would likely use military assistance as leverage over Kyiv. He may also try to use U.S. commitment to NATO as leverage over Europe. Accept the deal on Ukraine, he might say, or the United States pulls troops from Europe and signals its unwillingness to live up to Article 5. Such a scenario would, of course, be a gift to Putin.
Even this leverage, however, may not be enough to force Ukraine and Europe on board. Ukrainian domestic arms production is increasing rapidly. European production of weapons and ammunition is also on the rise. All this could at least partially offset the end of U.S. military assistance.
As for Trump’s commitment to NATO and Article 5, Europeans have anticipated U.S. wobbliness since the first time he was president. Increased defense spending across the continent is a sign that Europeans are starting to realize that they need to take greater responsibility for their own defense in a Trump-Putin world. Some countries, such as Hungary, will acquiesce to Trump, but the majority are likely to see the dangers of this route.
If Ukraine and Europe reject a Trump-Putin deal, the fighting will continue, Russia’s annexations will remain unrecognized by Kyiv and most European countries, and NATO membership will be off the table for the time being. In the end, such an outcome would be tantamount not to ending the war, but to a messy situation that favors Russia.
The real risk is not so much a bad deal, but rather that Putin strings Trump along as a way to undermine Western unity and support for Ukraine. With a weakened West, Russia moves closer to its objectives of subjugating Ukraine and remodeling the global security order. In this way, Trump’s efforts to cut a deal may not only incentivize Putin to ultimately reject a deal, but also to play along with sham negotiations while continuing to fight—a tactic that will be more than familiar to students of Russian diplomacy.
What should the Europeans do? They need to urgently step up and act before Trump starts moving ahead on a deal with Putin. It is likely that Trump’s team may reach out to the Kremlin even before Trump is sworn in, if it is not already doing so via Elon Musk and other Russia-friendly interlocutors. If Europe wants to be relevant and have a say over its own destiny, there are four things it needs to do.
First, Europe needs to ramp up defense spending now, including an immediate commitment to a new minimum of 3 percent of GDP. In addition, each country should give 0.5 percent of its GDP to Ukraine for military assistance, including investments in Ukraine’s defense sector. Bearing a greater share of the burden would give Europe greater room for maneuver in the face of a Trump-Putin deal and the possible withdrawal of U.S. engagement in NATO. It would also undercut Trump’s criticism that allies are not contributing enough. Seizing the $300 billion in frozen Russian assets, the bulk of which is in Europe, would be a quick way to get more money for weapons and ammunition.
Second, Europe needs to have skin in the game. This means sending European troops to Ukraine as trainers and advisors, as well as deploying air defense assets to front-line countries, from where they can intercept Russian missiles and drones over Ukraine. This would send a strong signal that Europe can take greater responsibility for its own security and that of Ukraine. It would also give Europe more leverage over any future deal and possibly a role for European troops in overseeing a cease-fire.
Third, European NATO allies should reaffirm their commitment to making Ukraine a member of the bloc. NATO membership is the only security guarantee that will ensure Russia does not attack Ukraine again in the future and thereby stabilize the continent. Trump may renege on U.S. support for eventual NATO membership for Ukraine, but other allies should lock in NATO’s commitment to membership now—or at least prevent NATO from formally closing the door. Ukraine’s EU accession process becomes more important now that the NATO track could be blocked; it may ultimately be the EU that has to provide security guarantees for Ukraine.
Finally, Europe should link any Trump administration threats to water down the U.S. commitment to NATO and Article 5 to Europe’s willingness to work with Trump on China. Washington needs Europe to counter Beijing, but if Trump is not ready to help with security for Europe, then Europe should make clear that it is not interested in joining forces on China. For Europe to defend its interests, it must be ready to engage in tough transactional bargaining—just like Trump.